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INTRODUCTION

Class actions are "unique creatures with enormous potential for good and
evil."' Even those who proclaim their virtues, however, would have to
concede that two class actions on behalf of the same class are rarely better than
one. Yet dueling class actions-two or more class actions commenced on
behalf of the same class or overlapping classes, which present claims arising
2
out of the same transaction or occurrence-are rampant.
Dueling class actions lie at the intersection between two overlapping sets of
cases: class actions and duplicative suits. 3 First, consider dueling class actions
as a subset of class actions generally. Because class counsel often have more
money at stake than any individual class member, and hence more to lose by
going to trial, class counsel generally face immense pressure to settle and even
to collude with the defendant to settle the class claims cheaply in exchange for
a generous fee. This problem is exacerbated in the dueling class action
context, as the lawyer representing the class knows that if she does not settle
with the defendant, class counsel in another action will. Hence, dueling class
actions enhance the pressure to settle and increase the likelihood of inadequate
settlements.
Additionally, both class members and the court rely on class counsel and the
defendant to discover and present relevant information regarding the
appropriateness of class treatment, the strength of the claims presented and the
merits of any proposed settlement. Hence, the class and the court will be
denied complete information once class counsel and the defendant reach a
settlement as they now have a greater interest in gaining judicial approval than
in providing complete information. These informational deficiencies are
exacerbated in the dueling class action context as class members are
bombarded with notices from the multiple suits. Not surprisingly, these class
members may disregard notices sent in the later suit, mistakenly believing that
they are copies of notices sent in the first suit.
' Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fay, J., specially
concurring).
2 Dueling class actions have also been referred to as overlapping class actions. See
George T. Conway I1, The Consolidationof Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1101 (1987); Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
514, 516 (1996).
3 Dueling class actions are a subset of the larger phenomenon of duplicative litigation.
See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN,

COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND

MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 147-48 (1992).

DUELING CLASS ACTIONS

2000]

Dueling class actions not only suffer from the problems that bedevil class
actions generally, but they also struggle with other complications inherent in
duplicative litigation. For instance, scarce resources are wasted whenever a
party files two suits seeking relief for the same wrong. This waste of resources
problem is more serious when the duplicative suits are class actions because
class litigation consumes substantial resources. Likewise, whenever one of
two related suits goes to judgment or settles, the court entertaining the second
suit must consider the extent to which the first judgment has preclusive effect.
The preclusion issues that arise in dueling class actions are far more complex,
however, as courts struggle to balance the interests of absent class members
with the costs of re-litigation and the risk that parties dissatisfied with a
decision rendered in one class action will attempt to avoid it by filing a dueling
class action.
Judicial tools currently exist to ameliorate some of the problems posed by
dueling class actions, but they all suffer from limitations or weaknesses. Thus,
courts and legislatures must take action to reduce the number of dueling class
actions and to relieve the problems they cause. A number of "quick fixes" are
available including: (1) creation of a registry of all class actions filed, (2)
amendment of Rule 23 and state class action rules to bar the certification of
dueling class actions and to require the appointment of a class action advocate,
(3) amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act to enlarge the authority of federal
courts to enjoin dueling class actions, (4) amendment of the multidistrict
litigation statute to permit transferee courts entertaining consolidated dueling
class actions to retain the cases for trial and (5) enactment of legislation
requiring better notice to absent class members in dueling class actions.
Congress and the state legislatures should also explore more dramatic solutions
to permit the consolidation of all dueling class actions in a single forum.
Part I of the Article presents a typology of the different kinds of dueling
class actions, noting the two critical variables of jurisdiction and time. Part II
elaborates on the myriad of problems posed by the different kinds of dueling
class actions. Part III considers the effect that the Supreme Court's decision in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein4 has had on these problems, and

Part IV evaluates the efficacy of existing judicial tools to curb them. Finally,
Part V presents a range of possible legislative solutions, some modest and
others bold, to reduce the number of dueling class actions and to ameliorate the
problems they pose.
I. A TYPOLOGY

AND AN ILLUSTRATION

A. A Typology: The Variables of Jurisdictionand Time

Because the problems posed by dueling class actions differ depending upon
the type of class actions involved, it is helpful to categorize them. Dueling

4

516 U.S. 367 (1996).
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class actions may be filed in the same jurisdiction or in different jurisdictions.
They may be pending simultaneously or one may be filed only after another is
dismissed. These two variables-jurisdiction and time-define the different
types of dueling class actions.
If dueling class action suits are filed in the courts of a single jurisdiction-in
one federal judicial district or in one state-consolidation and intrastate
transfer vehicles are generally available to ensure that the suits are handled
together.5 Once additional jurisdictions are introduced, however, it becomes
more difficult to ensure that the dueling class actions are resolved in tandem.
Three variations exist. 6 The competing suits may be filed in different
federal judicial districts (the federal/federal cases), in the courts of different
states (the state/state cases) or in both state and federal courts (the federal/state

cases).

7
Given the availability of a variety of transfer vehicles in the federal system
and a liberal consolidation rule, 8 the federal/federal cases tend to be the least
problematic. 9 The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act,'0 approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1991 and
designed to alleviate problems in the state/state and federalstate cases, has not
been enacted in any state. l ' For now, then, the state/state and federal/state
cases are most prone to the problems described in Part II below.
In terms of the second variable-time-many dueling class actions are
pending simultaneously, with representatives filing two or more suits on behalf
of the same class raising the same claim at the same time (simultaneous class
actions). Another variation is possible, however. A class action filed in one
jurisdiction may be dismissed, typically after the court denies class
certification or disapproves a proposed settlement, only to be followed by the
filing of another class action on behalf of the same class, raising the same
claim (sequential class actions). 12 Although the label "dueling" may seem

5 See infra Part V.A.
6 See Miller, supra note 2, at 516 (describing "three main situations" that arise as a result

of the jurisdictional variable).
7 See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers within the Federal
Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 679-82 (1984) (describing federal transfer statutes); see
also infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (requiring only a common question of law or fact in the pending
actions for their consolidation).
9 See Miller, supra note 2, at 519-20 (explaining that the federal-court system is efficient
because it is a unitary jurisdiction).
0 14 U.L.A. 189 (Supp. 1999).
See id. (historical and prefatory notes).
12See Robbin v. Fluor Corp., 835 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that pendency
of prior class action, which was voluntarily dismissed after denial of class certification,
failed to toll the statute of limitations for present class action); Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No.
18844, 1995 WL 775363, at *4-5, 9 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17, 1995) (approving $950 million
settlement for a class action claim following Texas court's prior refusal to approve $750
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more appropriate for simultaneous class actions, sequential class actions also
"duel" to the extent that the first class action may have a profound effect on
subsequent ones, and the mere possibility of another class action influences the
first one.
Some cases involve both simultaneous and sequential class actions: either
simultaneous class actions are dismissed only to be followed by another class
action, or a single class action is dismissed only to be followed by two or more
simultaneous class actions (multi-temporal class actions). As will be seen in
Part II, the simultaneous and sequential class actions raise some different
problems, and the multi-temporal class actions have the potential to raise them
all.
B. An Illustration:The General Motors Pickup Truck Litigation
When it came to light in 1992 that the side-mounted fuel tanks on General
Motors ("GM") pickup trucks enhanced the risk of fire upon impact, numerous
class action suits presenting similar claims were filed in various state and
federal district courts throughout the country. 13 GM removed several state

class actions to federal court,1 4 and then petitioned the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ("Panel") to transfer the federal actions to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Detroit.1 5 In
February 1993, upon agreement of the parties, the Panel transferred the federal
suits to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for pretrial proceedings to be
coordinated or consolidated with the actions pending there. 16 The transfer

million settlement of same claim).
13Suits were filed in 26 federal courts and 11 state courts. See In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 1998).
14 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 779 (3d Cir. 1995).
15See Andrew Blum, GM Lawsuits Pile up in Philly; Despite Slamming NBC, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 3.
16See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 961,
1993 WL 65087, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 26, 1993) (transferring six actions to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania). After the Panel transferred all of the federal actions to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, GM removed a number of other state class action suits to federal
court, presumably with the expectation that they also would be transferred as tag-along
actions. See Barnes v. General Motors Corp., Civ.A. No. 93-1128-MLB, 1993 WL 245740,
at *1 n.l (D. Kans. June 23, 1993) (discussing class action filed in Kansas state court on
behalf of Kansas owners of GM pickup trucks, which was removed to federal court in April
1993); In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
961, 1993 WL 153781, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1993) (discussing class action filed in North
Carolina state court, which was removed to the Eastern District of North Carolina in March
1993); In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
961, Civ. No. 93-1811, 1993 WL 147245, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1993) (discussing class
action commenced in Tennessee state court, which was removed to the Eastern District of
Tennessee). The Panel was aware at the time of seven other related actions, which it
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order, however, did not affect Dollarv. General Motors Corp.,17 a class action
filed on behalf of all Texas owners of specified GM trucks in Texas state court,
which GM had been unable to remove to federal court,18 or the other
nonremovable state suits.' 9 Thus, federal and state class actions were pending

simultaneously.
Following the Panel's transfer, a consolidated amended class action
complaint was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a
nationwide class, alleging federal and state law claims. 20 The class sought
both compensatory and punitive damages for economic losses and an
injunction requiring GM to recall the trucks or pay for their repair. 21 Personal
22
injury and wrongful death claims were explicitly excluded.
Even while opposing class certification in papers filed with the district court
in late June 1993,23 GM began to explore the possibility of a settlement with
class counsel in both the federal and state actions. 24 By mid-July--only four
months after the filing of the consolidated class action complaint-GM and
class counsel had reached a settlement in principle. 25 On July 19, 1993, the
suggested should be treated as potential tag-along actions. See In re General Motors Corp.
Pickup Truck, No. 961, 1993 WL 65087, at *1 n.1 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 26, 1993) (relying on
Panel Rules 12 and 13). Ultimately, of the dozens of class actions filed against GM, the
federal suits were either dismissed, remanded to state court, or transferred to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. See In re GeneralMotors Corp. Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 779.
17Class Action No. 92-1089 (Tex. Dist Ct. 71st Judicial Dist., filed on Nov. 2, 1993).
18 See Blum, supra note 15, at 3 (describing Dollar as "the one class action that plaintiffs
were able to retain in state court, after a legal battle"). The complaint in Dollar alleged
violations of a Texas statute as well as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract
and breach of warranty. See Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex.
App. 1994), aff'd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996). The Texas Court of Appeals did not
mention any federal claims raised by the class in the complaint. See id.
19 Another class action filed in state court in Kansas, which was removed by GM, was
remanded to state court. See Barnes v. General Motors Corp., Civ.A. No. 93-1128-MLB,
1993 WL 245740 (D. Kans. June 23, 1993) (remanding the action to the state court because
of lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction). Yet another state class action suit filed in
Louisiana, White v. General Motors Corp., Class Action No. 42,865 (La. 18th Jud. Dist. Ct.
Parish of Iberville, filed on Dec. 19, 1996) (final order and judgment) (on file with author),
plays an important role in the GM saga. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
20 By the summer of 1993, 287 suits, including 23 class actions, had been transferred to
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of the multidistrict litigation. See Andrew
Blum, GM Settlement Praised,Opposed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 3.
1 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F.
Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1993), vacated, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
22 See id.
23 See THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 29, 1993, at 4 (describing GM's arguments

against certification of the class).
24See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck, 55 F.3d at 779 (noting intensive
settlement discussions between the parties in June 1993).
25 See id. at 782. The proposed settlement covered 36 class actions. See Court Rejects
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federal plaintiffs moved the district court for authorization to disseminate
notice of the settlement to the class members. 26 The district court promptly
approved the motion, preliminarily concluding that the terms of the settlement
were fair, reasonable and adequate, and certified a class for settlement
purposes only. 27 Individual notices were mailed to approximately 5.7 million
federal class members, of whom only 6450 objected to the proposed settlement

28
and 5203 opted out of the class.
Following a fairness hearing on October 26, 1993, the district court
approved a settlement pursuant to which each class member would receive a
$1000 certificate toward the pur,,hase of a new GMC or Chevrolet light duty
truck. 29 Four days later, the district court summarily approved class counsel's
unopposed petition for an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $9.5
million and costs in the amount of $451,912.31 to be paid by GM. 30 The
Texas trial court also acted quickly when notified of the parties' proposed
settlement. A class was certified for settlement purposes only, notice was sent
to members of the class, and a fairness hearing was held on October 27, 1993,
the day after the federal hearing. 31 On November 3, the trial court approved
the settlement and awarded class counsel $9 million in attorneys' fees and

32
$500,000 in expenses.

In both the federal and Texas actions, objectors appealed the orders
approving the settlements and awarding attorneys' fees and expenses. The
Texas Court of Appeals reached a decision first, reversing the state court

Settlement in GM Gas Tank Case, Assoc. PRESS, April 17, 1995 available in 1995 WL
4383700.
26 See In re GeneralMotors Corp Pickup Truck., 846 F. Supp. at 332.
27 See id.

28 See id. at 334 (treating the silence of more than 99% of the class members as a strong

factor in favor of the settlement). The numbers of opt-outs and objectors in the Texas
litigation were likewise very small. See Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422,
430 (Tex. App. 1994) (noting the trial court's conclusion that the low number of opt-outs
and objectors favored approval of the settlement), af'd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
29 See In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck, 846 F. Supp. at 332-344. The
certificates were transferable only in restricted circumstances.
See id. at 333, 338
(concluding that about 50% of the class would actually use the certificates).
30 See In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
DKT. 961, 1993 WL 533155, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1993). The petition was submitted
jointly by lead counsel and the steering committee. See id. at *1. In an opinion filed several
weeks later, the district court conducted a more thorough review of the reasonableness and
fairness of the petitions for fees and expenses, ultimately concluding that its decision to
approve the petition was correct. See In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961, 1994 WL 30301, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1994) (justifying
the fee arrangement under both the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods), vacated,
55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
31 See Bloyed, 881 S.W.2d at 427.
32 See id. at 427-28.
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judgment and finding that the settlement was "not fundamentally fair,
adequate, and reasonable to the class members ....
,,33Many class members
would have been unable to redeem or transfer the certificates but nevertheless
would have released GM from liability. GM would have experienced a
windfall because issuance of the certificates would have enabled it to sell many
more trucks than it otherwise would have (at a hefty profit) and nothing would
have been done to remedy the allegedly unsafe trucks. 34 The Texas Court of
Appeals also held that notice to the class was deficient in that it failed to
disclose the amount of attorneys' fees sought by class counsel, and that the
35
evidence did not support the $9 million fee award.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also vacated the settlement, citing
problems with both the settlement itself, and the procedures and standards
employed by the district court in approving it. 36 Emphasizing that "actions
certified as settlement classes must meet the same requirements under Rule 23
as litigation classes," 37 the appellate court vacated the certification order. 38 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that the district court had failed to make
findings that the class complied with Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). 39 The court also
expressed grave doubt about the adequacy of the representation, especially in
40
light of the conflicts of interest between different groups of class members.
In finding the settlement inadequate, the court expressed doubt about its value,
the reaction of the class to it and the failure of the parties to develop the case

13 Id.

at 426.

34 See id. at 431-33 (stating that a more fair and reasonable settlement could have

provided for repair of the trucks by GM or for reimbursement in cash if truck owners
wanted to make the repairs themselves).
31 See id. at 435-36 (asserting that because the attorneys' fees directly influence the net
payment to class members, they need to know the amount of the fees to decide whether to
opt out or object to the settlement).
36 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1995). Although the court's disposition made it unnecessary for it to pass
on attorneys' fees, the court clarified the governing standard for fee awards to guide the
district court on remand. See id. at 779, 819-22 (concluding that percentage of recovery
method would be more appropriate in the case than the lodestar method because the fee and
the settlement comprised a common fund out of which the court should reward counsel's
efforts for success or penalize for failure).
37 Id. at 788, 799 (stating that "there is no lower standard for the certification of
settlement classes than there is for litigation classes").
38 See id. at 799-800.
39 See id. at 794, 800 (holding that formal findings under Rule 23 are mandatory for
certification of settlement classes because their legitimacy "depends upon fidelity to the
fundaments of Rule 23"); see also FED R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
40 See In re GeneralMotors Corp. Pick-up Truck, 55 F.3d at 800-04 (noting that the fleet
owners would have had more difficulty using the coupons within the 15-month period than
would the individual owners and expressing concern about the vigor of class counsel's
representation).

2000]

DUELING CLASS ACTIONS

before reaching the settlement. 4 1 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit expressly left
open the possibility that the district court on remand might certify a settlement
42
class that complied with Rule 23 and approve a revised settlement.
GM and class counsel declined the Third Circuit's invitation to present a
better deal to the district court on remand. Rather, in early July 1996, they
moved to intervene in yet another dueling class action brought on behalf of a
statewide class of GM truck owners, already pending in the 18th Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Iberville, Louisiana. 43 It also requested that colead counsel and the Plaintiffs Executive Committee in the federal
proceedings be appointed to serve as counsel for the class along with other
counsel. After these requests were granted, 44 GM and class counsel presented
a revised settlement to the Louisiana court. The court preliminarily approved
the settlement, provisionally certified a nationwide class, ordered that notice be
45
sent to the class, and scheduled a fairness hearing for November 6, 1996.
Fearful that the Louisiana court would approve a settlement that they viewed
as essentially identical to the one the Third Circuit had deemed inadequate, a
group of objectors moved the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to enjoin the Louisiana proceedings. 46 The district court denied
the injunction, 47 and shortly thereafter, the Louisiana court entered a final
judgment approving the settlement. 48 On appeal, the Third Circuit was in the

4" See id. at 806-14, 818-19 (calling the settlement "a sales promotion for GM" and citing
evidence of significant class opposition to the settlement).
42 See id. at 804, 819 (doubting that the class could meet the certification requirements on
the current record, but not precluding the possibility of certification on a more developed
record).
43 The Louisiana class action suit had been filed on February 11, 1993. See White v.
General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480, 482 (La. Ct. App. 1998). On May 17, 1993, the
Louisiana court granted plaintiffs' motion for certification of a statewide class. See id. at
483. This decision was stayed by a Louisiana appellate court on August 9, 1993, after the
federal district court preliminarily approved the nationwide settlement. See id.. Notably,
the claims initially raised in White on behalf of the Louisiana statewide class were "virtually
identical" to those asserted on behalf of the nationwide class. See White v. General Motors
Corp., Class Action No. 42,865 at 4 (La. 18th Jud. Dist. Ct. Parish of Iberville, filed on Dec.
19, 1996) (final order and judgment), rev'd, White, 718 So. 2d 480.
4 See White, 718 So. 2d at 484.
45 See id. at 485.
46 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
MDL 961, 1996 WL 683785, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir.
1998).
" See id. The district court also denied the objectors' motion to intervene in the federal
action. See id. at *5-6.
48 See White, 718 So. 2d at 485 (stating that the trial court approved the settlement on
December 19, 1996). A copy of the Louisiana court's Final Order and Judgment, which was
rendered on December 19, 1996, is attached as Appendix B to the opinion of the Court of
Appeals of Louisiana in White, 718 So. 2d at 502-11.
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awkward position of having to determine whether the district court had erred in
declining to enjoin a state court action that already had proceeded to final
judgment. Although expressing some discomfort with the procedure followed
by GM and class counsel, 49 the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the
50
injunction against the Louisiana action.
While the last chapter of this saga has yet to be written, the GM case, which
involved both simultaneous and sequential class actions filed in both federal

and state courts, illustrates many of the problems that plague dueling class
actions: duplication of effort, waste of judicial resources, inordinate pressure
on class counsel to settle and difficult preclusion problems. These problems
and others that frequently arise in the dueling class action context will be
explored in Part II.
II. THE PROBLEMS
A. Pressureto Settle
In virtually every class action seeking money damages, the person with the
most at stake financially is the attorney representing the class. The attorney's
interest in securing the highest fee and the class members' interest in attaining
the greatest recovery often diverge; the attorney has an incentive to settle the
case prematurely, locking in a high fee without expending a lot of time or
money. 51 The class members, with so little at stake in the first place, have

'9 The court noted that "the procedure followed by appellees gives us pause ..
" In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 137 (3rd
Cir. 1998).
5 See id. at 140-46.
51See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions
86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 686-91 (1986) (arguing that class counsel has incentive to settle
early and quickly under both the percentage of recovery and lodestar methods for
determining attorneys' fees) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney];
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 35-36, 40-44 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion]; Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle
for Too Little, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 479, 485-87, 493-97 (1997) (asserting that the principal
reason for accepting low settlements lies in the different share class counsel has in the
settlement and the trial award); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 22-25 (1991) (arguing that although the
attorney-client conflict depends on the type of litigation and procedure, it remains
significant in all class and derivative lawsuits under the present regulatory system)
[hereinafter Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role]; George L. Priest, Procedural
Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort ClassActions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 530 (1997)
(stating that the most serious criticism of the modern mass tort class action is directed at the
conflict between class counsel and class members); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G.
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insufficient incentive to closely monitor class counsel and her strategic
choices. 52 Thus, in a single class action, class counsel's own self-interest may
53
cause her to prefer early settlement to trial.

Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A CriticalAnalysis, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 423, 432 (1993) (explaining why the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods
can lead to inefficient settlements).
52 See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 681
(7th Cir. 1987) (noting that "the negotiator on the plaintiffs' side, that is, the lawyer for the
class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his principals") (citations omitted); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1346 (1995) (asserting that litigant's autonomy over important personal interests in
litigation can be an illusory goal because of the weak economic incentives for the individual
plaintiffs) [hereinafter, Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The
Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 318 (1981) (noting that most class members "have too small an
individual interest in the litigation to give it close attention"); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots
and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385; 395-96
(1987) (asserting that if class member control were the only restraint on lawyer's selfinterest, nothing in the class action would prevent lawyers from compromising clients'
interests to get larger fees); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to
Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 912 (1995) [hereinafter Macey &
Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform]; Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's
Role, supra note 51, at 3, 7-8, 20 (arguing that even if some plaintiffs wanted to monitor
class counsel's conduct, they would hardly influence class counsel because he or she must
act for the benefit of the class as a whole and not according to the individual wishes of its
members).
" See Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991)
(noting the danger "that the lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a
less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees") (citations omitted);
see also, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888 (1987)
[hereinafter Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation]; Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 51, at 690 (noting that sophisticated defendants may
exploit class counsel's tendency to settle early in their own interests); Coffee, The Unfaithful
Champion, supra note 51, at 36-37 (arguing that acceptance of early and inadequate
settlements can occur under the lodestar formula even though the plaintiffs' counsel and the
defendants believed that they acted in good faith); Hay, supra note 51, at 480-82 (arguing
that excessively low settlement amounts are the product of attorney incentives that can be
adjusted to remedy the problem); Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra
note 51, at 25 (noting that under the percentage of recovery method an attorney who settles
early earns much more than an attorney who expends greater efforts); Julie Rubin,
Auctioning Class Actions: Turning the Tables on Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Abuse or Stripping the
Plaintiff Wizards of Their Curtain, 52 Bus. LAW. 1441, 1445 (1997) (arguing that
compensation formulas can leave unfulfilled the task of eliminating the attorney-client
interest in class actions); Kurt A. Schwarz, Note, Due Process and EquitableRelief in State
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 415, 440441 (1989) (arguing that the Shutts decision provided defendants with means to induce
quickly favorable settlement in overlapping class actions).
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At least prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor,54 the willingness of some courts to certify for settlement purposes a

class that could not satisfy the certification requirements for litigation,
increased the pressure on class counsel to settle. 55 After all, if the class could
not be certified for litigation under the standard requirements, class counsel
could not credibly threaten to take the case to trial and thus were forced to
' '56
settle, bargaining "with at least one arm tied behind their backs.
Add to this mix yet another class action filed on behalf of the same class,
and the pressure to settle becomes even more irresistible. 57 Each attorney
understands that once the class members' claims are resolved by judgment or
settlement, any other suits pending on their behalf raising the same claim will
be dismissed on claim preclusion grounds. Class counsel also knows that she
will receive nothing if the class action she filed is dismissed. Thus, each
lawyer for the class realizes that it is in her own self-interest to race toward
judgment or settlement before any other lawyer representing the same class on
58
the same claim gets there.
Even if the class has a very strong claim on the merits and class counsel
14 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997) (holding that a class action certified for settlement purposes
only must still satisfy all of the Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) requirements).
" See John C. Coffee, Jr. The Corruptionof the Class Action: The New Technology of
Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1995) (discussing the eventual willingness of
courts to accept "settlement class actions" in the late 1980s).
56 See id. at 854 (noting the significance of settlement as a "defendant's weapon" in the
class action context); see also, e.g., Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 52, at 1379-80; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rule of Law: The Corruptionof the Class Action, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at
A15 (contending that the principle of the class action lawsuit has expanded beyond logical
limits due to settlement pressures); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1136 (1996) (stating "although most class actions are
settled anyway, licensing settlements when no class action trial is possible gives all the
leverage in the settlement negotiation to one side, the defendant"). This pressure to settle
class actions that cannot be tried exists even in the absence of dueling class actions. See
Coffee, The Corruption of the Class Action, supra note 55, at 853-54 (discussing mass tort
class actions).
17See, e.g., Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation, supra note 53, at 910
(noting that "separate actions induce a rush to judgment").
58 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 235 (1983) ("The
entrepreneurial attorney has considerable reason to regard his fellow plaintiffs' counsel as
more his competitors than his colleagues, because they are all engaged in a race to claim the
prize ....
");Conway, supra note 2, at 1101 (stating that when there are parallel class
actions, "the individual's claims become subject to an 'irrational resolution by a race to
judgment"'); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in
Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998)
[hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, The Inadequate Search]; Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1986); Schwarz, supra note 53, at 439-40.
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ordinarily would prefer to go to trial rather than settle at a discount, the
attorney must acknowledge that she cannot control the pace at which the court
will entertain her action. The existence of another simultaneous suit on behalf
of the same class before a different court makes the race to judgment very
risky. Thus, class counsel most likely will decide that it is in her own best
interest to settle the action and guarantee that she is compensated for her work
on the case.
The defendant is aware that class counsel is under substantial pressure to
settle. Based on this knowledge, the defendant may make a "low ball" offer in
an effort to settle the class claim for far less than it is worth. The defendant
may even agree not to oppose class counsel's application for exorbitant fees or
may propose a side deal that assures class counsel a hefty fee, 59 if class counsel
agrees to the low-ball offer. The pressure on class counsel to collude with the
defendant in this manner may be extreme. 60 Even if class counsel is able to
resist this pressure, the defendant may simply go knocking on the door of
another lawyer representing the class to see if she will succumb. Thus, in
Professor Jack Coffee's words, the defendant is able to engage in a "reverse
auction," pitting the various class counsel against one another and agreeing to
61
settle with the lawyer willing to accept the lowest bid on behalf of the class.

5' See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 622 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that
"class counsel presented the suit and settlement together with counsel for the CCR
defendants in one package, after having negotiated with CCR a side-settlement of over $200
million for cases in their 'inventory'), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591(1997); see also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L.REV. 1045, 1078-86, 1128-37 (1995).
60 See, e.g., Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative
Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 391 (1994); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Attorney's Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the System Fairer,57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 51, 82-83 (1988); Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 53, at 647-48;
Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 58, at 232-33; Michael A.
McCabe, Class Backwards: Does the Fairness, Adequacy and Reasonableness of a
Negotiated Class Action Really Have Any Effect on Approval?: General Motors Corp. v.
Bloyed, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 183 (1997); Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in
Class Action Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 291, 307-08
(1994); see also Prezant v. DeAngelis, 636 A.2d 915, 922 (Del. 1994) (noting that the
"temporary settlement class procedure.., facilitates premature, inadequate, and perhaps
collusive settlements because plaintiffs' counsel is under strong pressure to conform to the
defendants' wishes at the early stages of the litigation").
61See Coffee, The Corruption of the Class Action, supra note 55, at 853 (stating that
"defendants can effectively conduct a reverse auction among plaintiffs' attorneys, seeking
the lowest bidder from the large population of plaintiffs' attorneys"); see also Romstadt v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 701, 703 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that after the
class representative in the first-filed class action rejected a proposed settlement offer, the
defendant made "the same, or substantially the same," offer to the class representative in a
dueling class action pending in another state court), amended, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20477
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 1996); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The
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In many respects, class counsel face a dilemma similar to the classic
"prisoner's dilemma" of game theory. 62
In the federal/state class action context, this irresistible pressure to settle is
compounded by a relative inequality in bargaining power between class
counsel and the defendant. If the state action raises only state law claims, and
the simultaneous federal action raises claims within the federal court's
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, then class counsel in the state case is at a
severe disadvantage in trying to negotiate a global settlement with the
defendant. 63 She cannot threaten to litigate the federal claims in an effort to
compel the defendant to increase its settlement offer because she has not even
alleged them in her complaint. Thus, if she wants to be the attorney who
settles with the defendant, to ensure that she is compensated for her work on
65
the case, 64 she may feel compelled to accept an inadequate settlement.
B. InformationalDeficiencies
Class action settlements induced
informational deficiencies that harm
and the court to assess the adequacy
actions suffer from these problems
deficiencies.

by this pressure suffer from a number of
the ability of class counsel, class members
of the proposed settlement. Dueling class
in addition to some unique informational

1. Class Counsel
Because class counsel in dueling class actions are under such enormous
pressure to settle with the defendant quickly, they often begin negotiations
Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SuP. CT.
REV. 219, 239 n.80 [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond]; Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 56, at 1113.
62 See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 52, at 1371-72 n.105.
63 See, e.g., Coffee, The Corruptionof the Class Action, supra note 55, at 852 (defining a
"global settlement" as one by which the parties "agree to settle the plaintiffs' attorneys'
entire inventory of existing cases at the prevailing market rate for such claims if the same
attorneys will agree to bring and settle a class action on behalf of other (largely future)
claimants on a less favorable basis"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (1995); Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note
61, at 235-42.
6 If the federal class action raising only federal claims were settled first, the state class
action likely would be precluded if the state and federal claims were transactionally related.
The result would be that the attorney representing the class in state court would receive no
fee. Furthermore, some courts have held that a state court settlement judgment can preclude
exclusively federal claims. See infra notes 201-21 and accompanying text, as well as Part
III (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita).
65 See, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 235-36
(noting the lack of bargaining power of the state class attorney who cannot litigate the
exclusive federal claims); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 56, at 1136 (noting grave risk of
abuse in class actions "that can be settled, but not tried").
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before they have undertaken substantial discovery66 and therefore are not wellpositioned to assess the strength and value of the class's claim. 67 This
informational deficiency is more severe in federal/state dueling class actions
where the federal class action raises claims within the exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In such cases, class counsel in the state
litigation has no reason to perform a pretrial investigation of the federal
claims, 68 has no incentive to take discovery on the facts underlying the federal
claims, and yet is under pressure to settle the exclusively federal claims as part
of a global settlement with the defendant. 69 Since she has virtually no
information regarding the strength or value of these federal claims, she lacks
the information needed to assess the adequacy of any proposed settlement offer
by the defendant with respect to the federal claims.
While the lawyer representing the class in the state action could seek
information about the federal claims from the lawyer representing the class in
the federal action, the lawyer in the federal action has little to gain and much to
lose by providing such assistance. After all, if the attorney in the state suit
reaches a settlement that releases the exclusively federal claims, the state
judgment could have preclusive effect, barring the federal action and the
70
payment of fees to the lawyer representing the class in federal court.
2. Class Members
The informational deficiencies suffered by class members are far more
severe than those suffered by class counsel. Consider the problems faced by
class members generally before adding the complication of a dueling class
action. Class members depend upon class counsel to provide them with
information regarding the terms of any proposed settlement. Once class
counsel has reached an agreement in principle with the defendant, however,
she has a strong self-interest in gaining judicial approval of the settlement.
Thus, class counsel may be more interested in limiting the number of class
members who opt out 71 and assuring judicial approval of the deal rather than
66 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1995) ("With an early settlement, both parties have less
information on the merits.... Without the benefit of more extensive discovery, both sides
may underestimate the strength of the plaintiffs' claims.").
67 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80

CORNELL L. REV. 941, 965 (1995); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the
Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 485-87

(1996).
68 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (requiring counsel to perform a pre-filing inquiry into the
facts and law underlying the claim).
69 See Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 235-37, 245-46.
70 See infra Part III (explaining how state class action settlement potentially precludes
exclusive federal claims pending in federal court).
71Settlement agreements occasionally protect the defendant from individual suits by
providing that the defendant may disavow the settlement if more than a specified number of
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providing full and fair disclosure of the settlement terms.
The court has a special responsibility to ensure that the class receives
adequate notice of the proposed settlement. 72 Nevertheless, just as class
counsel's own interests may conflict with full disclosure to the class, the court

may also have an interest in approving a settlement to clear its docket and gain
73
prestige as the court that supervised the settlement of a complex class action.
Accordingly, the court may approve a notice that omits certain facts that might
cause class members to consider objecting or opting out of the class. For
instance, courts have approved notices to class members that failed to disclose
meaningful information, such as the amount of fees to be paid to class
counsel, 74 the terms of the distribution plan, 75 that simultaneous class actions

class members choose to opt out. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., C.A. No. 930215, 1995 WL 251402, at *7 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 1995) (declining to enlarge the time
afforded class members to opt out and discussing the defendants' right to withdraw from the
proposed settlement if an excessive number of class members opted out); In re Taxable
Municipal Bond Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL-863, 1994 WL 643142, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov.
15, 1994) (describing settling defendants' "option to terminate the settlement in all respects
if the aggregate amount of the claims of class members who opt out exceeds a specified
dollar amount"); Martin v. Lepercq/DBL Biltmore Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, No. 89 Civ.
8573 (LMM), 1994 WL 465914, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1994).
72 Three separate portions of Rule 23 discuss the court's responsibility to ensure that the
class receives adequate notice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), 23(d)(2), 23(e).
73 See, e.g., In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 545 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (noting that
"the court, which approves the settlement, clears its docket of troublesome litigation");
Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 52, at 1445 ("Eager for docket-clearing settlement, trial
courts face a temptation to close their eyes to conflicts and improprieties that they would not
tolerate in other contexts."); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 805, 829 (1997) ("No matter how virtuous the judge, the fact remains that courts are
overworked, they have limited access to quality information, and they have an
overwhelming incentive to clear their docket."); Koniak, supra note 59, at 1122; Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 56, at 1122-24 (stating that "[j]udicial self-interest may lead judges to
seek power, prestige, and autonomy..."); Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role,
supra note 51, at 45-46; Thomas & Hansen, supra note 51, at 433.
" See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that
it was not an abuse of discretion to approve the settlement notice as such); In re The
Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 530 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that
class notice was sufficient), aff'd sub nor. Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283 (3d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 890 (U.S. 1999); cf Bennett v. Behring Corp., 96 F.R.D.
343, 354 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (rejecting objector's contention that the notice failed "to provide
specific information as to fees" and identifying paragraph in notice that disclosed amount of
fees sought), aff'd, 737 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir. 1984). But see General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed,
916 S.W.2d 949, 957 (Tex. 1996) (setting aside settlement "because the class members did
not receive adequate notice of ... the projected amount of attorneys' fees and expenses").
75 See, e.g., Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1993); In
re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. California v. ARC Am.Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Corrugated Container
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filed on behalf of the same class were pending elsewhere, 76 that additional
theories of liability not pressed in the class action could have been pursued
against the defendant, 77 or that some class members had objected to the

78
proposed settlement.

Not only are class members sometimes deprived of information necessary to
make an informed decision regarding the opportunity to opt out, but class
members who wish to object to a proposed settlement often are frustrated in
their efforts to take discovery in an attempt to uncover collusion or other facts
that might demonstrate the inadequacy of the settlement. 79 Concerned that

Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1981).
76See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1317 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
the adequacy of notice in the context of dueling derivative actions); In re Corrugated
ContainerAntitrust Litig., 643 F.2d at 224; In re: The Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices
Litig., 962 F. Supp. at 529 (holding notice "need not describe parallel state court
proceedings or all potential state law causes of action"); Romstadt v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
948 F. Supp. 701, 703 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1996), amended, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20477 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 10, 1996); Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified Settlement Class, 638
N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 680 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 1997). Of course,
some class notices have disclosed the pendency of dueling class actions. See Weinberger v.
Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 1982); cf Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1987) (detailing the adequacy of class notice
and stating that "taken as a whole the notice is not seriously misleading").
77 See Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. at 529 (stating that "the
Class Notice ... clearly advises class members ... that 'Prudential will be released from all

claims that have been or could have been asserted by Class Members' if the Proposed
Settlement is approved.").
78 See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir.
1995), aff'd sub nom. Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 145 F.3d 513 (2d Cir.
1998); PrudentialIns. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. at 529; Behring, 96 F.R.D. at
353-54.
" See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp., 834 F.2d at 684 (noting that "[d]iscovery of settlement
negotiations in ongoing litigation is unusual because it would give a party information about
an opponent's strategy"); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)
(rejecting objectors' contention that they should have been given "authority of discovery
from which they could fashion an effective presentation" at the fairness hearing); In re Ford
Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CIV.A. MDL-991, 1994 WL 593998, at *4
(E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1994) (stating that "discovery into the negotiations of the proposed
settlement is improper unless there is some independent evidence of collusion") (footnote
omitted); White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1429 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th
Cir. 1994). But see In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106,
1124 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that "the conduct of the negotiations was relevant to the
fairness of the settlement and that the trial court's refusal to permit discovery or examination
of the negotiations constituted an abuse of discretion") (footnote omitted); In re PrudentialBache Energy Income Partnerships Sees. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 177, 181 (E.D. La. 1993)
(expressing concern about limited opportunity counsel representing some 2000 opt-outs had
for taking discovery).
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such satellite discovery would unduly complicate the litigation 80 or give a party
access to an adversary's litigation strategy 8 or privileged information, 82 courts
often deny objectors the opportunity to take discovery, especially of settlement
83
negotiations.
Now consider the additional informational deficiencies that result when a
second class action is introduced. First, the tension between class counsel's
own interest and her obligation to provide full disclosure to the class is
heightened in the simultaneous class action context; class counsel knows that
attorneys' fees will be paid only to the attorney who first obtains judicial
approval of a settlement. A notice that raises too many concerns or causes too
many class members to object may nix the deal. Thus, the attorney
representing the class in a dueling class action may allow her own self-interest
to interfere with her obligation to disclose all of the details of the settlement to
the class.
Second, the pendency of dueling class actions raises the possibility that class
members will receive multiple notices. If two or more simultaneous class
actions are proceeding at roughly the same pace, class members may receive a
notice in each suit of the pendency of the class action. If the class member
opts out of the first suit, it may be quite confusing to receive another notice
later that looks an awful lot like the first notice. 84 The class member may
disregard the second notice, mistakenly assuming that it is a duplicate of the
first, thereby failing to opt out of a separate class action entirely. This
likelihood is increased if the notices fail to mention the existence of other
simultaneous actions.
The same problem arises in the case of sequential class actions. A class
member may receive a notice in one class action and decide, based on the
80

See, e.g., Bolger, 2 F.3d at 1315 (quoting the Seventh Circuit, noting that, "[t]he

temptation to convert a settlement hearing into a full trial on the merits must be resisted");
Mars Steel Corp., 834 F.2d at 684; Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974)
(discussing the threat of new counsel coming in and "thwart[ing] the settlement process" by
requesting documents and starting the "case anew"); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco H Prods.,
1994 WL 593998, at *3.
81 See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp., 834 F.2d at 684; McKersie v. IU Intern. Corp., No. 86 C

1683, 1987 WL 14009, at *3 (N.D. I11.July 9, 1987) (discussing the possibility of sanctions
if plaintiff's discovery requests are "nothing more than a 'fishing expedition' designed to
harass"); cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1946) (discussing the awkwardness
of an attorney having to appear as a witness in her client's case).
82 See McKersie, 1987 WL 14009, at *1-*2 (granting a protective order against a
discovery request by "disgruntled class members" that "reaches matters.., protected under
the attorney-client privilege").
83 Courts may also be concerned that such discovery would uncover information that
might compel the court to disapprove the settlement.
4 See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the
"likelihood that the members of the West Virginia class will be confused as to their
membership status in the dueling lawsuits").
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information disclosed, whether to opt out or not. Yet, if the proposed
settlement in the first suit is disapproved or if the suit is dismissed for other
reasons, no follow-up notice is sent to class members. 85 When the second of
the sequential class actions is filed and notice is disseminated, class members
again may assume that this is the same suit and that their previous opt-out is
still effective. But failure to opt out of this second suit will not be excused by
such confusion. 86 Thus, class members in dueling class actions suffer all of the
standard informational deficiencies that arise whenever a class action settles, as
well as some that are unique to the dueling class action setting.
3. The Court

Even if a trial court is truly committed to scrutinizing a class action
settlement, it is often at an informational disadvantage. After all, American
judges are supposed to be passive and rely upon the parties to bring to their
attention all relevant facts and competing arguments. 87 If the defendant and
class counsel reach a settlement, obviously they will present it to both the class
85 Rule 23(e) provides that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e). But courts have differed on whether notice is required when the dismissal or
settlement precedes class certification. See, e.g., Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919
n.8 (lth Cir. 1996) (noting that "[i]n this Circuit, the applicability of Rule 23(e) to
proposed classes prior to their certification is an open question") (citations omitted);
Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1986) (construing Rule
23(e) to apply "to all complaints containing class allegations, unless the district court
declines to certify the class," but reiterating that "Rule 23(e) does not invariably require
notice when a case is settled prior to certification"); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298,
1314 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that "if it has found neither collusion nor prejudice, it is
within the discretion of the District Court... to approve the dismissal without requiring...
a notice as mandated by 23(e)"); see also 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.66 (3d ed. 1992); 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at 366 (2d ed. 1986). But see Speaks v. New

York Life Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 340, 344 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that a trial court's
failure to require notice of the dismissal of a class action before certification "might
constitute reversible error where it could be shown that class members were injured as a
result").
86 See In re Prudential Secs. Inc. Partnership Litig., MDL No. 1005, 1996 WL 739258
(2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
absent class members' motion to enlarge their time to opt out notwithstanding their
confusion regarding the need to opt out; appellants had opted out of an earlier, related class
action filed in a different jurisdiction and had not received notice of the later class action)
(unpublished disposition).
87 See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 2-4 (1984) (discussing the neutral and passive fact finder); Macey & Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 66 (noting court's passivity in reviewing
typicality and adequacy of named representative).
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and the court in the most favorable light, downplaying any possible
weaknesses or problems with the deal. 88 In the absence of an adversarial
proceeding, the court is very poorly situated to uncover any potential conflicts
between class counsel and the class, or among various class members, or to
otherwise assess the fairness of the proposed settlement.
This problem is less severe when the parties reach a settlement after having
engaged in some adversarial proceedings before the court. If, for example, the
court holds a hearing to determine whether to certify the class before the
parties have reached a settlement, then the defendant typically will object to
class certification. 89 This will bring to the court's attention the problems with
adequacy of representation, conflicts among members of the class, typicality of
the named representative and commonality of the issues. 90 This adversarial
hearing should provide the court with sufficient information to determine
whether the named representative and class counsel will adequately represent
the class and whether conflicts exist among the class members. If class
counsel and the defendant later reach a settlement and jointly present it to the
court, the court will still suffer from the informational disadvantage described
above. But at least it may have some confidence that the deal was negotiated
by class counsel and deemed "adequate" following an adversarial hearing. 9 1
Likewise, if the settlement is reached after the parties have engaged in other
adversarial proceedings in the litigation, such as filing pleadings, taking
discovery or making and defending against dispositive motions, then the court
has access to some information regarding the relative merits of the underlying
claims and defenses. In such cases, the court is better situated to assess the

88 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997); Kamilewicz v. Bank

of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (parties
"may even put one over on the court, in a staged performance").
89 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES

36 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) ("In three of the four study courts, defendants opposed
certification in slightly over 50% of the cases with a motion or sua sponte order regarding
class certification.").
90 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-60 (1982) (identifying
problems with the typicality of the named representative's claim in a contested class action);
Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014, 1019-21 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing defendant's
opposition to class certification, including challenges to the named representative's standing
to bring suit, the adequacy of his representation, and satisfaction of the predominance
requirement); Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463-65 (9th Cir. 1995)
(addressing typicality and adequacy of representation requirements in contested class
action).
91 See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 52, at 1381-82; Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita
and Beyond, supra note 61, at 243; cf Koniak & Cohen, supra note 56, at 1165 (noting that

"as class action courts now hold fairness hearings, these hearings are not adversary
proceedings").
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92
adequacy of a subsequent settlement.
But even these prior adversarial proceedings will not ameliorate the special
informational deficiencies faced by a state court assessing the adequacy of a
settlement in the federal/state dueling class action context. In such cases, the
defendant will want a global settlement, releasing it of all liability arising out
of the alleged wrong, whether the liability arises under state or federal law.
Even if the state court has some sense of the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the state claims and defenses based on the proceedings before it, the court
will not have seen the pleadings regarding the claims within the federal court's
exclusive jurisdiction.
Those pleadings and the discovery and motions
associated with them will have been handled only in the simultaneous federal
class action. Thus, a state court presented with a settlement in a federal/state
dueling class action context will not receive the information necessary to
assess the fairness of the settlement from class counsel or the defendant and
will not be able to piece it together from prior litigation before the court. 93 Nor
will the state court have the background experience with the exclusive federal
claims that a federal judge might have, which would prove useful in assessing
94
the fairness of a settlement that releases such claims.
In such federal/state cases and in all cases in which class counsel and the
defendant reach a settlement before engaging in substantial adversarial
proceedings, the court is at a grave informational disadvantage. This is
because neither class counsel nor the defendant will bring the deal's problems
to the court's attention, nor will the court have access to prior litigation
materials that might tip it off to such problems. In such cases, the only parties
that have an incentive to raise problems with the settlement are absent class
members and counsel in simultaneous class actions. Yet, class members will
95
rarely have enough at stake in the litigation to object to the settlement.

92 See Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 243.

But see

Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General,supra note 58, at 247 (stating that "the time
so expended may be largely pointless, being consumed by discovery, motion practice, and
other makework that is not intended to advance the litigation, but only to justify the predetermined settlement").
93 Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 243 (discussing the
phenomenon of class counsel and defense counsel withholding any information that may
indicate the settlement is unfair).
14 See, e.g., In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 11740, 1993 WL 43024, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 1993) (expressing reluctance to assess the merits of federal claims as
"outside the jurisdiction of this Court"), aff'd, 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993); Kahan &
Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 245 n.103 ("In some cases, the
difficulty is further enhanced by the state court judge's lack of expertise with the governing
federal law."); Stephen E. Morrissey, State Settlement Class Actions That Release Exclusive
Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for Multijurisdictional Management of

ShareholderLitigation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1765, 1766-67 (1995).
91 If they did have a lot at stake, the class members likely would have chosen to opt out
instead.
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Without sufficient investment in the litigation, it is unlikely that class members
will monitor class counsel,96 review the fairness of the settlement and raise

objections before the court.
Who then objects when the court conducts a fairness hearing? Typically,
the class representatives in dueling class actions object while their counsel
undertake the effort of identifying the potential deficiencies in the proposed
settlement. 97 While such counsel may have a sufficient stake to engage in a
serious review of the settlement, their limited access to important information
(such as the compensation to be paid to class counsel and the details of the
settlement negotiations) impairs their ability to remedy the informational
deficiencies faced by the court.
Additional problems are created when courts must to rely on objectors and
their counsel for information. Just as class counsel may agree to a settlement
to protect their fees, it is likely that class counsel in a dueling class action,
appearing on behalf of objectors, are also operating out of self-interest.
Needless to say, both the- defendants and the class counsel who negotiated the
settlement will seek to discount the significance of the objections by
emphasizing the self-interest of the objecting counsel. 98 After all, the objecting
counsel will only be compensated if they succeed in the dueling class action
96 See, e.g., Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 53, at 652; Jill E. Fisch,

Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 533, 552 (1997);
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 56, at 1104; Julia C. Kou, Closing the Loophole in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 261 (1998) (stating that
"class actions ... present significantly greater opportunities for attorneys to engage in
opportunistic behavior, because the representative plaintiff's typically small stake in the
action..."); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183,
1203 (1982); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 936-37 (1998).
97 See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d
677, 684 (7th Cir. 1987); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting
that one group of objectors were named plaintiffs in a dueling class action); City of Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974) (expressing concern that "no class
action would ever be settled, so long as there was at least a single lawyer around who would
like to replace counsel for the class and start the case anew"); In re MCA, 598 A.2d at 689
(agreeing with class counsel in parallel federal action that it would be unfair to bar
meritorious federal claims in favor of a minimal state settlement); Macey & Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 47-48; cf Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class
Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 329 (1983) (noting that "[w]ith surprising
regularity, the primary opponents of class treatment of mass tort litigation are the plaintiffs'
lawyers").
18 See In re Federal Skywalks Cases, 97 F.R.D. 380, 388 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (suggesting
that a member of the class counsel team was seeking a moratorium on judicial approval of
the class settlement in an effort to extract an advantage for an individual client); Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 56, at 1107 ("Lawyers are sometimes motivated to challenge proposed
settlements in the hope of reaping some later economic benefit, such as success in one's
own bid to be class counsel in a later suit or continued income from individual suits .... ").
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that they have filed. That suit, however, will be barred if this settlement is
approved. Presented with allegations of self-interest and manipulation, the
court may not know whom to believe. Accordingly, the court may disregard
the information provided by the objectors, the only parties with an incentive to
uncover flaws in the proposed settlement. 99
Even though courts may view with skepticism the objections raised by
counsel in dueling class actions, it is better for courts to receive this
information than not. To this limited extent, then, dueling class actions may
actually alleviate some of the informational deficiencies inherent in class
action settlements. If, however, the problems posed by dueling class actions
outweigh these informational benefits, then lawmakers must work to limit the
number of dueling class actions and to ensure that courts receive complete and
accurate information regarding the class and its representatives, the strength of
its claims and the fairness of any proposed settlement. 10 0
C. Waste of Resources

Dueling class actions not only suffer from the problems faced by class
actions generally, but also from the problems that inhere in all duplicative
suits. For example, whenever two or more suits are pending between the same
parties on the same claim, a number of resources are wasted. First, scarce
judicial time and energy are wasted when two courts supervise two suits on
essentially the same claim. Second, the defendant must pay its counsel to
defend it in each lawsuit even if the same claim is pressed on behalf of the
same plaintiffs, multiplying the defendant's costs. Third, plaintiffs' attorneys
duplicate one another's efforts if they file similar suits on behalf of the same
party or class. Finally, non-party witnesses are forced to endure the
inconvenience of multiple depositions, multiple subpoenas seeking the same
documents and multiple trials at which they may be compelled to testify.
These problems common to duplicative litigation have caused many0 l scholars
and legislators to address the multi-party, multi-forum phenomenon.'
" See Mars Steel Corp, 834 F.2d at 684 (upholding exclusion of evidence offered by
objectors before the court preliminarily approved the settlement; noting that the excluded
evidence was "of little value at best," and "offered in the main by persons having financial
or professional relationships" with class counsel in a dueling class action); Bowling v.
Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
100 See infra Parts V.A.1, A.2.b. (presenting proposals to ensure that courts receive more
complete information).
101 See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE

(1995);
Miller & Crump, supra note 55, at 75-76; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley,
Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction,135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 10-11
(1986); Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion:
Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925; Joan
Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1040-41 (1993); Symposium, The
Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L.
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES
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Class actions rarely go to trial, so one need not be too concerned about
witnesses being compelled to give trial testimony in dueling class actions. But
the other resource concerns identified earlier pervade dueling class actions. In
fact, they are pronounced because the costs of defending against class actions
and the judicial costs in overseeing them are usually very high.
D. PreclusionProblems

Whenever two or more suits raise claims arising out of the same transaction
and one of them goes to judgment, the court in the other suit must determine
the preclusive effect, if any, of the judgment. 112 When the duplicative suits are
dueling class actions, the preclusion issues are more complex and timeconsuming for three reasons.
First, courts address issues that are unique to class action litigation, such as
the preclusive effect of a decision declining to certify the class, or whether a
plaintiff in a later suit was a class member in the action that went to judgment.
Second, because absent class members are not parties to the class action, courts
must determine whether to preclude them from litigating not only claims that
were presented in the first class action, but also claims that might have been,
but were not, raised. Finally, courts must protect the due process rights of
absent class members. In grappling with these issues, courts attempt to
balance the interests of absent class members in pursuing their rights with the
costs of re-litigation and the risk that parties dissatisfied with a decision

rendered in one class action will attempt to avoid it by filing a dueling class
action. Thus, the usual tension between an individual's right to pursue all
avenues of legal recourse and the policies underlying preclusion law is
enhanced when the first suit is a class action because the court entertaining the
second suit must protect class members not individually represented in the
prior litigation. This tension is even greater in the dueling class action context
due to the high costs of re-litigation.
Let us begin with an examination of the unique preclusion issues that arise
surrounding the certification decision. What effect does a decision by a court
declining to certify a class in one action have in simultaneous or sequential
class actions filed on behalf of the same class? 10 3 Because only parties or their
1, 3-5 (1996). See infra notes 314, 318 and 357 for reference to several legislative
proposals.
102 For a thorough history of preclusion doctrine as applied to class actions, see generally
REV.

Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
103Some courts in the dueling class action context have failed to address the issue
altogether, presumably because the later suit was filed by a different representative and/or
no party in the second suit raised the issue. See, e.g., Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc.,
No. IP.94-2067-C-HG, 1995 WL 680630, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 1995) (noting denial of
class certification in another class action filed on behalf of same class, but failing to discuss
issue preclusion); Bowling , 143 F.R.D. at 155 n.14 (noting that federal court in California
had denied a motion to certify a nationwide class action, but declining to mention issue
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privies are bound by decisions against them' °4 and because absent class
members are not bound by decisions entered in class litigation until the class is
certified, 05 an order denying certification ordinarily will not be binding in
dueling class actions filed by different putative class representatives.

06

Even

if the representative is the same, or privity exists, a court nevertheless may
decline to extend issue preclusive effect to an order denying certification if the
underlying litigation in the first suit (maintained by the plaintiff on her own
07
behalf) remains pending because the order will lack the requisite finality. 1
Even if the decision denying certification is deemed final, a court will give it
issue preclusive effect only if the issues decided in reaching the certification
decision are identical to the issues raised in the dueling class action. 10 8 Thus, if
the second suit is filed on behalf of a slightly different class, the court will
have to determine whether the identity of issues requirement is met. 10 9

preclusion). Issue preclusion, like other affirmative defenses, is waived if not raised by the
defendant. See, e.g., Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 1997);
Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996); Kelson v.
City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 657 (9th Cir. 1985).
"oSee Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798-99 (1996) (discussing privity
and class action exceptions to general rule that only parties are bound by a judgment);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
105 See Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1986); Roberts
v. American Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1975).
106See, e.g., Martin,1995 WL 680630, at *3-10 ; Furey v. Geriatric & Med. Ctrs., Inc.,
Nos. CIV.A.92-5113, CIV.A.93-2129, 1993 WL 283884, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1993)
(noting that "[tihe fact that the plaintiffs named in [the first class action] complaint have
been precluded from seeking recovery on behalf of the putative class does not-indeed,
could not lawfully-preclude other members of the class from bringing an action on behalf
of the class").
107 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d
133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "denial of class certification... lacks sufficient finality
to be entitled to preclusive effect"); Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 367
(Tex. App. 1994)("A class certification order cannot usually be characterized as final or
irrevocable because it is subject to redetermination as the litigation progresses."); see also
J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1996); cf Barnes
v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (having denied a previous
motion to certify a class, the court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the prior opinion's
findings regarding satisfaction of the 23(a) requirements were "law of the case"), aff'd, 161
F.3d 127, 155 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1760 (1999). Under revised Federal
Rule 23(f), "A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying class certification under this rule .... " FED. R. Civ. P.
23(f).
108 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck, 134 F.3d at 146.
09 Courts have had to consider whether the two classes were the same in a variety of
different contexts. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 143738 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that members of the second class were members of the first class
action, and hence barred from relitigating their claims); Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., v.
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Likewise, the court in the second action will have to determine whether the
standards for certification in the two jurisdictions are sufficiently similar to
meet the identity of issues requirement. 0 Even identical language in the class
certification rules of the two jurisdictions may fail to guarantee that this
requirement for issue preclusion is met if the rules are interpreted and/or
applied differently in the different jurisdictions."'I Indeed, in one case, the
Fifth Circuit noted that because the certification decision is a discretionary one,
"each court-or at least each jurisdiction-[should] be free to make its own
determination in this regard."' 12 Thus, the protections and limitations built into
preclusion doctrine-designed to protect non-parties and to ensure that only
issues actually litigated are precluded-provide litigants with opportunities to
"repackage" class actions rejected by one court and file them in another

McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1337 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that members of the second class
were not bound by findings made in the first class action even though they were included in
the "overly broad" definition of the first class), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 918, 918-19 (1993); Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211, 215 & n.2

(D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the "class to be certified [in the second suit] is essentially
identical" and noting that the "minor difference [between the two classes] does not affect the
merits or the nature of the motion for class certification in any significant way"); In re
Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1113 & n.2 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(noting that the classes in the two actions were "virtually identical" although one was
"slightly broader").
l10See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck, 134 F.3d at 146 (noting that "our
construction of Rule 23 and application to the provisional settlement class is not controlling
on the Louisiana court, because it is not bound by our interpretation of Rule 23. Rather, the
Louisiana court properly applied... the parallel Louisiana class certification rule"); Cullen
v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1987) (declining to bar the plaintiffs from
relitigating the certifiability of the class; stating that "[s]ince the standards governing the
propriety of the suit as a class action in the state court and the federal court differed
significantly, the state court ruling did not decide the issue presented in this case"). See
generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.10, at 679-89 (3d ed. 1999)

(discussing the requirement for collateral estoppel that the issues litigated be identical); id.
§ 16.8, at 771-74 (discussing the binding effect of a class action judgment).
.. See Morgan, 889 S.W.2d at 367-68 (denying issue preclusive effect to a federal
decision declining to certify a mandatory class action even though the Texas and federal
rules were identical because "[c]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the standards of
proof for the maintenance of a class action are different in federal and state court"); see also
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 56, at 1114 n.206 (stating that "even if one court rejects class
certification, there is generally no collateral estoppel effect on the ability of a second court
in a different jurisdiction to consider certifying the class").
"2 Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d at 180; see also 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4434, at 327 (1981) (stating that "[i]f preclusion is to

be denied, it should be on the ground that many procedural matters may be so far
discretionary that a second court should be free to make its own determination") (footnote
omitted).
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If the court in the first class action certifies the class and subsequently enters
final judgment in the class action, different issues and problems arise. Are
absent class members barred from suing the defendant on the same claim
outside the confines of the first class action, or may they somehow avoid claim
preclusive effect? Courts addressing this question must balance the class
members' rights against the policies underlying preclusion law: finality,
14
efficiency and consistency.'
To understand the complexity of the preclusion issues that arise in dueling
class actions, first consider the issues that arise whenever a person who was
arguably a member of the class attempts to sue individually (rather than on
behalf of a dueling class action). The court must first determine whether the
plaintiff in the second suit was an absent class member in the first class action.
In addressing this question, courts sometimes grapple with multiple and
inconsistent class definitions used in different documents in the first suit. 115 A
court applying even a single definition may encounter difficulty in some
circumstances."16
113 Notwithstanding all of these hurdles and caveats, some courts have estopped plaintiffs
from relitigating the issue of class certification, having litigated once and lost. See, e.g., Lee
v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 822 (S.D. Ga. 1987) (concluding that a party cannot
avoid res judicata effect of federal court's denial of class certification by filing suit in state
court "and point to largely illusory differences between statutes that are designed for
essentially identical purposes"); Bartlett v. Miller & Schroeder Muns., Inc., 355 N.W.2d
435, 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the trial court struck "the class action
allegations based on collateral estoppel due to denial of certification in federal district
court"); see also 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, § 4455, at 473 (1981) (stating that
"[w]ould-be representatives who have failed in an attempt to secure certification of a class
action... may be precluded from a second attempt to advance the same claims as a class
action") (footnote omitted); cf In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d
213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that "[t]here are strong arguments.., for applying the rule
of collateral estoppel to a class action determination when the plaintiff is engaging in
multidistrict litigation," but declining to accord such effect to an order denying class
certification followed by a voluntary dismissal of the action by plaintiff).
114 See James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral
Estoppel Against Nonparties to PriorLitigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383, 394 (1983).
1.5See, e.g., W. Alton Jones Found. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 97 F.3d 29, 36, 37 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that the "documents incorporated into the judgment defined the plaintiff-class
in conflicting ways"; concluding that the plaintiff in the second suit was not precluded even
though it was "covered by the literal definition of the plaintiff-class in a class action
settlement"); City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., No. CIV.3-89-0466, 1990 WL 265171, at *3
(D. Minn. Feb. 27, 1990) (noting that the stipulation of dismissal did not specifically address
how parties with both direct and indirect purchasers were to be treated).
116 See, e.g., Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1225-26, 1229 (11th Cir.
1998) (noting disagreement between parties on whether plaintiff was a member of class in
earlier litigation; declining to resolve issue because notice to class members was inadequate
to satisfy due process); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 32 F.3d 654, 658 (2d Cir.
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Assuming that the court concludes that the plaintiff in the second suit
was a class member in the first class action, it must then determine whether the
claim presented in the second suit is the same as the claim presented in the
class action.
The [general] rule [of claim preclusion] provides that when a court of
competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a
cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter
bound "not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose .... " The
judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be
brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever,
absent fraud or some other factor invalidating the judgment. 1 7
In determining the scope of the claim litigated in the first action, many
jurisdictions apply an expansive "transactional" test 18 that states, "the claim
extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose." 119 Thus, if an
individual sues her employer for race discrimination and seeks an injunction
barring discriminatory conduct in the future, the judgment in the action
(whether favorable or not) will bar the plaintiff from bringing a second suit
seeking money damages for the harm suffered as a result of the defendant's
discriminatory conduct. 20 Preclusion doctrine bars the plaintiff from splitting

1994) (holding that party was barred from relief under consent order settling class action
because party pursued identical relief in prior action); Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., v. McNary,
969 F.2d 1326, 1337-38 (2d. Cir 1992) (concluding that plaintiffs were not members of the
class in the prior action because different relief was sought; criticizing overbroad class
definition in prior suit); Louisiana Seafood Management v. Foster, 46 F. Supp. 2d 533, 54245 (E.D. La. 1999) (concluding that the identity of parties requirement was met in dueling
class action setting).
117 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (quoting Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)).
118See, e.g., Porn v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1996)
(determining, "pragmatically," what factual grouping constitutes a transaction); State v.
Smith, 720 P.2d 40, 41 (Alaska 1986) (stating that "[a] mere change in legal theory" does
not constitute a different transaction); Orselet v. DeMatteo, 539 A.2d 95, 97 (Conn. 1988)
(noting that the transactional test will preclude a second claim even if different relief is

sought); Currier v. Cyr, 570 A.2d 1205, 1209 (Me. 1990) ("The doctrine of res judicata
demands that a plaintiff seeking legal relief plead all theories of recovery then available to
him."); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (N.Y. 1981) (concluding that
two claims arose from the same transaction, even if the second was "embellished by later
events").
119RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).
20 See, e.g., Mirin v. Nevada ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. , 547 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir.
1976); Lambert v. Conrad, 536 F.2d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1976); Powell v. Doyle, No.
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her claim and suing for different kinds of relief in different suits.
But if the first suit, seeking injunctive relief, was brought as a class action,
the question arises whether an individual class member may bring a second
suit seeking money damages. The Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
FederalReserve Bank of Richmond 12 1 casts some light on this question. There,
individuals representing a class of employees alleged that a bank had engaged
in a pervasive pattern of racial discrimination. 122 The district court found such
a pattern only with respect to two pay grades. 123 When class members who
were employed in other pay grades filed another suit alleging discrimination,
the Fourth Circuit held that their claims were precluded by the district court
decision. 124 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the rejection of a
claim of classwide discrimination does not warrant the conclusion that no
member of the class could have a valid individual claim."' 125 In other words,
the class members were not precluded from litigating the issues underlying
their individual claims because they were different from the issues determined
in the class action.
The Cooper Court implicitly assumed that the individual claims were not
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion even though they appeared to
involve the same transaction or series of connected transactions that were
litigated in the class action. Language in the Court's opinion makes this
assumption understandable. If the individual claims were barred by the
judgment in the class action, then "every member of the class [would feel
compelled] to intervene to litigate the merits of his individual claim,' 126 a
result obviously at odds with the purposes of Rule 23. Thus, without
specifically so stating, the Court suggested that the doctrine of claim
preclusion should be adapted to accommodate the class action. Professors
Wright, Miller and Cooper have elaborated on this suggestion:
The basic effort to limit class adjudication as close as possible to matters
common to members of the class frequently requires that nonparticipating
members of the class remain free to pursue individual actions that would
be merged or barred by claim preclusion had a prior individual action
been brought for the relief demanded in the class action. An individual
who has suffered particular injury as a result of practices enjoined in a
class action, for instance, should remain free to seek a damages remedy

72900, 1998 WL 703012, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1998).
121467 U.S. 867 (1984).
122 See id. at 869-70.
123 See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 642 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that
the district court did not find "a pattern and practice of discrimination pervasive enough for
the court to order relief" in all paygrades), rev'd sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
467 U.S. 867, 882 (1984).
124 See id. at 673-75.
125 Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878.
126 Id. at 880.
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even though claim preclusion would defeat a second action had the first
27
action been an individual suit for the same injunctive relief.
Because "individual" claims would present many individual issues, it would
be difficult or impossible to raise them in the context of the class action while
still satisfying the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) or the more
stringent requirements of (b)(1) or (b)(2). Thus, the most sensible option - and
the option taken by most courts-is to proceed with the class claims in the
context of the class action, and to permit individuals to sue on the "individual"
1 28
claims separately, claim preclusion notwithstanding.
In the dueling class action context-when the later suit is filed as a class
action rather than as an individual suit-and the claim presented could have
been raised in the first class action, the applicability of the "class action gloss"
on claim preclusion is more complex. Applying the class action gloss protects
absent class members who may well have believed that the class representative
had authority only regarding the claims alleged and presented. 29 On the other
127 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, § 4455, at 474 (footnote omitted); see also Bogard
v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that plaintiff was not precluded by

judgment in prior class action from pursuing individual claim because (1) the class action
notice had not informed class members that they could seek money damages and (2)
inclusion of individual monetary claims might have made the class action unmanageable).
128See, e.g., Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating and applying

the "general rule ... that a class action suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief
does not bar subsequent individual damage claims by class members, even if based on the
same events"); Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that suit
challenging plaintiff's conditions of confinement in state treatment center was not barred by
judgment in prior class action challenging conditions in same center); Hilliard v. Shell W. E
& P, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 169, 172, 173 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that "Michigan's broad
rule [of claim preclusion] should not be applied in the context of a class action ... [because]
protection of the class members should override the finality that Michigan's broad rule
would afford"; stating that "a class action settlement should not bar all claims that could
have been litigated between the parties but only those claims that were actually litigated");
Garvey v. Wall, 696 A.2d 71, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (noting that "the
invocation of res judicata or the entire controversy doctrine to bar a class member from
litigating a claim which could have been but was not in fact litigated in the class action may
be unfair"); cf Coates v. Kelley, 957 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (stating that "the
fact that the [prior] litigation was a class action does not in any way change the preclusion
analysis"). But see King v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 790 F.2d 524, 531 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that the judgment approving a settlement in a prior class action precluded an
absent class member from later pressing her arguably individual claim). Apparently "every
federal court of appeals that has considered the question has held that a class action seeking
only declaratory or injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual suits for damages."
In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 892 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
129 See Hiser, 94 F.3d at 1292 (concluding that a sequential class action challenging a
prison's refusal to photocopy legal documents was not barred by a consent decree in a prior
class action concerning prisoners' access to courts because photocopying had not been
expressly addressed in first suit); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 485
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hand, the gloss could enable parties dissatisfied with the results in one class
action to present a slightly repackaged claim on behalf of the same class in a
sequential class action brought in another jurisdiction. Again, the tension
between the protection of absent class members and the policies underlying
preclusion law is palpable.
The Second Circuit in National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile

Exchange1 30 gave this issue careful attention. There, a class action was
brought in federal court on behalf of purchasers of potato future contracts who
suffered financial harm when they liquidated the contracts during a specified
period of time (the "class period"). 131 Richards, an absent class member, not
only held contracts that he liquidated during the class period, but also contracts
that he was unable to liquidate after the class period had expired. 132 He
commenced a state court class action on behalf all who held contracts that
remained unliquidated after the class period. In the meantime, class counsel in
the federal class action entered into a stipulation of settlement with the
defendants, which stated:
[t]he settling defendants ... shall be released from any and all claims of
every nature and description asserted, or which might have been asserted
by plaintiffs and the class members or any of them against the settling
defendants ... based upon, arising out of, or in any way respecting any
act or omission relating to any of the matters or transactions set forth in
33
the Complaint. 1
According to counsel for one of the defendants, the release was intended to bar
future claims regarding both liquidated and unliquidated contracts, including
the claims presented in Richards's state court class action. 134 The settlement,
however, offered compensation only to those whose contracts had been
liquidated.
The class notice, sent to all persons who had liquidated contracts during the
class period, described the formula for distributing the proceeds of the
settlement among the class members, but did not mention the scope of the
release.135 Richards objected, noting that the broad release might bar his state
court class action. Class counsel explained to the court that he did not purport
to represent those whose contracts were not liquidated and did not intend to
settle their claims, but that the defendants wanted to leave the language of the
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that class members would not be deemed to have "waived" their
individual monetary claims in a class action seeking only medical monitoring because the
monetary claims could not have been brought in the context of the class action), aff'd, 161
F.3d 127, 155 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1760 (1999).
130 660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981).
131 See id. at 11.
132 See id. at 12-13.
133 Id. at 13 (quoting the formal stipulation of settlement).
134 See id. at 14.
135 See id.
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release broad enough so that they could argue to the state court that Richards'
class action was barred. Without deciding whether the release would in fact
preclude the state court class action, the district court rejected Richards'
136
objections and approved the settlement.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that approval of the
settlement was improper and stating that "[t]he most fundamental principles
underlying class actions limit the powers of the representative parties to the
claims they possess in common with other members of the class." 137 Here, the
class action was brought on behalf of those who liquidated their contracts
during the class period; the complaint mentioned nothing about other contracts,
nor did the order certifying the class or the notice to the class. Since the named
representatives in the federal action did not hold unliquidated contracts, they
could not have amended the complaint to represent those holding unliquidated
contracts had they wanted to.
If the case had gone to trial, any judgment would have barred only members
of the class who had not opted out from bringing claims based on the
liquidated contracts. But it "would not have barred members of the class from
bringing any other claim they might be able to assert against the defendants,
including claims based on contracts unliquidated at the close" of the class
period.1 38 In other words, the class action gloss on claim preclusion would
apply because the class representatives' authority was circumscribed. 139
Since a judgment after trial would not have extinguished claims not asserted
in the class complaint, the National Super Spuds court reasoned that a
judgment approving a settlement should not be able to do so either: "Having
received authority to represent class members solely with respect to liquidated
contracts, plaintiffs had no power to release any claims based on any other
contracts."' 40 While assuming that a settlement could prevent class members
from asserting claims relying on a different theory from the one relied on in the
class action, the court noted that the claims purportedly extinguished by the
proposed settlement "depend[ed] not only upon a different legal theory but
upon proof of further facts.. .,141 Thus, under National Super Spuds, not only
does the class action gloss on claim preclusion apply when the second suit is a
class action, but a release issued in connection with the settlement of a class
action can release claims not pressed in the initial class action only if they
"depend upon the very same set of facts ....

142

136See id. at 15-16 (describing the district court opinion).
117

Id.at 16.

138 Id.at 18 (emphasis in original).

13 See also Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); City of St. Paul v.
FMC Corp., No. CIV.3-89-0466,1990 WL 265171, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 1990).
140 National Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
141 Id. at
142

Id.

18 n.7.
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Not all courts agree. 143 Indeed, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein,inn the United States Supreme Court held that a state court judgment
approving a settlement that released exclusively federal claims barred a

dueling class action raising those claims in federal cpurt because the preclusion
law of the rendering state so required. 145 Although the Supreme Court's
decision in Matsushita is subject to criticism, 46 it highlights the critical role
played by state preclusion law in determining the preclusive effect of state

court judgments in dueling class actions. Some courts have held that a state
court judgment approving a settlement that purports to release claims within
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction is entitled to claim preclusive effect if
the federal claims arose from the same nucleus of fact as the state claims. 47 In
other words, a settlement may bar claims that were not and could not have

143 See, e.g., In re VMS Secs. Litig., 21 F.3d 139, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (enforcing

against absent class member the release, granted in connection with the settlement of the
class action, of all claims arising out of the purchase of an investment, whether or not they
were litigated in the context of the class action, including individual suitability claims);
Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding
injunction barring absent class member from suing on claims that arose out of same limited
partnership investments that were the subject of prior class action notwithstanding her claim
that "her suitability claims are inherently individual in nature"); TBK Partners, Ltd. v.
Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that "in order to
achieve a comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of settled questions at
the core of a class action, a court may permit the release of a claim based on the identical
factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the
claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the class action");
Steinmetz v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(concluding that second class action, raising a claim not expressly raised in the first class
action on behalf of the same class, was barred because the release granted in connection
with the settlement of the first class action was clear and broad); Ivy v. Dole, 610 F. Supp.
165, 168 (E.D. Va. 1985) (concluding that the consent decree entered in a prior class action
"not only resolved the common class claims, but it also disposed of the individual claims as
well"), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1505 (4th Cir. 1987).
14 516 U.S. 367 (1996). See infra Part II.
145 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378.
146 See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1563 (3d Cir.
1994) (stating that "[s]ince this judgment places the court's stamp of approval on a broad
release of all claims arising from the merger transaction, including any exclusive federal
claims, the subsequent federal court is precluded from entertaining a case involving claims
arising from the same nucleus of operative facts"); cf TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460
(holding that claims for appraisal were barred by release issued in connection with federal
class action notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention that the claims "could not have been
asserted on behalf of the class"); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A.89-1071,
1989 WL 73254, at *6 n.15 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1989) (noting that "[a] state court possesses
the authority to approve a settlement that releases claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts") (citations omitted), afftd, 947 F.2d 936, 936 (3d Cir. 1991).
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been brought in the first action if they are sufficiently closely related to the
claims presented. Other courts have held that a state court judgment cannot
bar an exclusively federal claim because the first court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain i.148

Because, under the Full Faith and Credit

Statute, 49 the preclusion law of the rendering state determines the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment, 150 these differing decisions regarding the
preclusive effect of a state court judgment may not reflect inconsistent
approaches, but rather different state preclusion laws.151
This analysis is further complicated by careful attention to due process and
the protection it provides to absent class members. Even if claims presented in
dueling class actions are identical, absent class members may avoid the
preclusive effect of a judgment entered in one such action if they were not
afforded due process therein. In class actions seeking only or predominately

148 See, e.g., Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d 453, 458 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that

"Oklahoma follows the general rule that a claim will not be barred by res judicata if the
court in the earlier action did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim"); Wolf v. Gruntal
& Co. Inc., 45 F.3d 524, 527 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Res Judicata is not implicated if the forum
which issued the prior 'judgment' lacked 'jurisdiction' over the putatively precluded
claim."); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732 (2d Cir. 1987); Abramson v. Pennwood
Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d
1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that arbitration panel's dismissal of state negligence and
fraud claims did not have preclusive effect over federal claims for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction). But see 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, § 4470, at 688 ("[S]ettlement of
state court litigation has been held to defeat a subsequent federal action if the settlement was
intended to apply to claims in exclusive federal jurisdiction as well as other claims.").
149 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). ("[J]udicial proceedings [of any court of any State] shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State .... "). "This
statute has existed in essentially unchanged form since its enactment just after the
ratification of the Constitution ... and its re-enactment soon thereafter .....
Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 n.8 (1980).
150 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996); Marrese
v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982).
51 Compare Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1104-07 (Del. 1989)
(concluding that the state chancery court had authority to approve a settlement that released
claims within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction as long as the claims released and the
claims presented in the state litigation "arose under the same set of operative facts") and
Marrese, 470 U.S. at 382 n.2 (indicating that lower federal courts should first look to state
law, rather than federal law, in determining the preclusive effect of state judgments), with
Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 953 F. Supp. 890, 894 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (stating that "under Ohio law,
claim preclusion requires that the rendering court possess subject-matter jurisdiction over
the original claim"), aff'd, 148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 543
(1998); National Amusements, Inc. v. City of Springdale, 558 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ohio
1990) (noting that Ohio res judicata law applies only to claims that were or might have been
litigated in the first lawsuit).
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money damages, due process requires that the named representative adequately
represent the interests of the absent class members. In such actions, due
process further requires that absent class members receive notice, an
152
opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to opt out.
In certifying the class, however, the court in the first class action already
will have found that the representation was adequate. 53 Given that finding,
the court in the later action will have to determine whether the absent class
members are barred, as a matter of issue preclusion, from relitigating the issue
of adequacy of representation. Courts have differed on this question. 154 Some
courts have addressed collateral challenges to the adequacy of representation
without mentioning issue preclusion at all, 155 while others have expressly
stated that issue preclusion does not bar absent class members from relitigating
152 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3, 812 (1985); see also Sam
Fox Pub'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40, 42-43 (1940); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 1789, at 238, 244-45, 247; Note,
Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589,
594 (1974); cf Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 800-02 (1996) (assuming
arguendo that Hansberry "may be read to leave open the possibility that in some class suits
adequate representation might cure a lack of notice") (citations omitted). In Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Court noted that "[t]he inherent tension
between representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to
damage claims gathered in a mandatory class."
153Federal Rule 23(a)(4) requires the court to find that "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Most state
court rules contain a similar provision, as due process requires adequacy of representation.
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
154 Scholars are also in disagreement. Compare, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita
and Beyond, supra note 61, at 264 (concluding that "as long as the court entertaining a
proposed class action affords class members fair opportunity to raise the issue, adequacy of
representation should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised collaterally") with
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 56, at 1170-71 (stating "the general rule that absent class
members are entitled to have a second court rule on whether they were adequately
represented in the class suit" and arguing "that the first proceeding should not count as a full
and fair opportunity to litigate misconduct connected to the settlement") (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court in Matsushita failed to address this question. See infra note 220 and
accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435-37 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that plaintiffs who did not develop symptoms from Agent Orange until after
the settlement of another class action were adequately represented by the first class); King v.
South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 790 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1986); Gonzales v. Cassidy,
474 F.2d 67, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding the representation of a prior class to be
inadequate). But see Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1992)
(declining to "second-guess a prior decision that counsel aaequately represented a class" and
requiring that the absent class member challenging adequacy of representation "show not
only that the prior representative 'failed to prosecute or defend the action with due diligence
and reasonable prudence,' but also that 'the opposing party was on notice of facts making
that failure apparent') (citations omitted).
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the issue of adequacy. 156 Various other courts have held that class members
who appear at a hearing in the first action and contest the adequacy of
representation are bound by the court's findings and barred from collaterally
attacking the judgment on the basis of adequacy of representation.157 At least
one court has held that absent class members subject to in personam
jurisdiction are bound by a finding of adequacy of representation even if they
58
did not participate at the fairness hearing.
Moreover, some courts have noted that even if the first court properly
concluded at the time of class certification that the representation was
adequate, the final judgment would still be subject to collateral attack upon a
showing that the representation was not in fact adequate. 59 Similar issues
156 See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) (doubting that
Delaware law "would allow an individual objector to bind an absentee on the issue of
adequacy of representation" and concluding that, even if it did, such a result would violate
due process), withdrawn and substituted by 179 F.3d 641(9th Cir. 1999); Battle v. Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1512-13 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (stating that an absent
class member is "not bound by the initial court's determination that she received due
process") (footnote omitted), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1992); Research Corp. v.
Edward J.Funk & Sons Co., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 580, 581 (N.D. Ind. 1971)
(stating that the court in the first class action was "'ill-equipped to test the adequacy of the
representation of absent class members .... [an issue which] can best be answered

realistically with respect to a particular person') (quoting Note, Binding Effect of Class
Action, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1954)).
157See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to vacate a Louisiana court judgment where
appellants did not exercise their opt our rights and actively participated in the settlement
approval process); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broad. Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that "a class member who is represented by counsel during a class action
settlement hearing is bound by the settlement agreement"); see also Note, CollateralAttack,
supra note 152, at 604 (arguing that "whenever the issue of adequacy of representation has
been actually litigated ... a finding of adequacy by the trial court should be res judicata as
to the quality of representation up to that point in the course of the litigation"). But see In re
Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 764 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989)
(declining to preclude a collateral attack on a judgment for lack of due process because the
basis for the appellate court's decision was unclear); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 42(1)(e) (1982) (stating that "[a] person is not bound by a judgment for or
against a party who purports to represent him if ...(e) The representative failed to
prosecute or defend the action with due diligence and reasonable prudence, and the
opposing party was on notice of facts making that failure apparent").
158Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1560-61 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Delaware court had in personam jurisdiction over the plaintiff, "who did
not make an appearance at the hearing to voice objections to the adequacy of the negotiated
settlement," so the plaintiffs were bound by the release that the court approved).
159 See, e.g., Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 72, 75. In that case, the court engaged in a two-part
inquiry: "(1) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine, initially, that the
representative would adequately represent the class? and (2) Does it appear, after the
termination of the suit, that the class representative adequately protected the interest of the
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arise when plaintiffs seek to avoid the preclusive effect of a prior judgment by
challenging the sufficiency of the notice, if any, provided in the first suit 160 or
16
the denial of an opportunity to opt out. '

In sum, dueling class actions give rise to a daunting array of complex
preclusion problems that challenge courts to balance the rights of class
members with the risk that dissatisfied litigants will attempt to avoid the result
in one class action by filing a slightly repackaged dueling class action before a
different court. Because dueling class actions also waste scarce resources,
impose inordinate pressure on class counsel to settle and cause informational
deficiencies, courts and legislatures should take action to reduce the number of
dueling class actions and to ameliorate the problems they pose. Before
considering the various alternatives available to lawmakers, let us first explore
more fully how the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita bears on these
problems.

class?". Id. (holding that representative's failure to prosecute an appeal on behalf of some
members of the class rendered his representation inadequate); Kemp v. Birmingham News
Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,
516 U.S. 367, 395 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that "the class representative's duty to represent absent class members adequately is a
continuing one"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (stating that
"the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately
represent the interests of the absent class members") (emphasis added); Guerine v. J & W
Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing courts' ongoing responsibility to
ensure that representation is adequate); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 85, § 1789, at 251-52.
160 See, e.g., Besinga v. United States, 923 F.2d 133, 135-37 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[W]here it
is clear that the trial court and the parties in [the prior class action] failed to comply with
Rule 23(c)(2)'s mandate that notice be provided to absent class members, it would defy
logic and law to hold that such putative class members are bound by res judicata.");
Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877-78 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that class
members were not bound because they did not receive notice); King, 790 F.2d at 529-30
(upholding sufficiency of notice notwithstanding the finding that the notification of the
proposed settlement "'may have been subject to some misinterpretation"') (quoting the
district court); Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Inds. Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159 (7th Cir. 1985); Wright v.
Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 847-48 (4th Cir. 1985); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 70-71
(2d Cir. 1982); In re Cherry's Petition to Intervene, 164 F.R.D. 630, 637 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
161 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[Wlhere both
injunctive and monetary relief are sought, the need to protect the rights of individual class
members may necessitate procedural protections beyond those ordinarily provided under
(b)(1) and (b)(2)."); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that because "Brown had no opportunity to opt out of the MDL 633 litigation, . ..
there would be a violation of minimal due process if Brown's damage claims were held
barred by res judicata"); Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Del. 1989);
Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir. 1983); Colt Indus.
Shareholder Litig., 565 N.Y.S.2d 755, 762 (Ct. App. 1991).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:461

III. THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN: MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO.
V. EPSTEIN

In a trilogy of recent decisions-Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein, 162 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,163 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
164
Corporationthe Supreme Court has finally begun to address some of the
difficult questions posed by class actions. While Amchem and Ortiz consider
the thorny problems raised by settlement class actions, 165 Matsushita directly
addresses dueling class actions, grappling with the difficult preclusion issues
that arise in dueling federal/state class actions.
Matsushita involved dueling class actions filed by shareholders of MCA,
Inc. challenging a tender offer for MCA's common stock by Matsushita
Electric Industrial Company. One day after the public announcement that
Matsushita and MCA were negotiating a possible acquisition and before a
merger agreement was even drafted, plaintiffs filed the first class action suit in
Delaware Chancery Court. 166 The suit alleged that MCA's directors breached
their fiduciary duty by failing to maximize shareholder value and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief. 67 Two months later, MCA and Matsushita
finalized the terms of the merger and announced that a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Matsushita would make a tender offer for all MCA outstanding
68

shares. 1

Several days after the tender offer was announced another class action was
filed. Filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of

162516 U.S. 367 (1996).
163 521

U.S. 591 (1997).
U.S. 815 (1999).
165Although the Amchem Court noted that "[siettlement is relevant to a class
164 527

certification," 521 U.S. at 619, it explained that some
specifications of [Rule 231-those designed to protect absentees by blocking
unwarranted or overbroad class definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened,
attention in the settlement context .... Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention
on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be
bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when
settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.
Id. at 620-21.
166See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 690 (Del. Ch. 1991) (stating
the procedural background of the case). Within two days of the public announcement, three
class actions were filed against MCA and its directors, which were consolidated by the
Chancery Court on October 2, 1990. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.
11740, 1993 WL 43024, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 1993), aff'd, 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993).
167 See In re MCA, 598 A.2d at 692.
168 See id. at 690 (describing the terms of the merger agreement).
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California, this suit, Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 169 alleged that Matsushita's tender
offer violated federal securities laws because it offered a better deal to Lew
Wasserman, MCA's chairman and chief executive officer, than to other MCA
shareholders. 170 Shortly after Epstein was commenced, the plaintiffs in the
Delaware action amended their complaint to allege a failure to disclose the side
deal made with Wasserman and to join Matsushita as a defendant. 7' The state
complaint did not allege, however, that the Wasserman deal violated the
federal securities laws. 172 Days later, in December 1990, the parties to the
state action filed a stipulation and settlement agreement. 73 This agreement
provided for the dismissal of the Delaware action with prejudice and released
all claims by class members arising out of the tender offer, including the
federal claims raised in Epstein.174 In consideration of the release, the
defendants offered to pay the Delaware class counsel attorneys' fees of up to
$1 million. 75 The defendants further agreed to have an MCA wholly-owned
subsidiary, Pinelands, adopt a modified poison pill plan that ostensibly would
have encouraged third parties to make a bid for Pinelands. 76 Since the MCA
shareholders received a Pinelands stock dividend, a weakening of the poison
pill would have redounded to their benefit. 177 On the same day that the
settlement agreement was filed with the Delaware
court, the court
78
provisionally certified the class and set a hearing date.
Finding nothing in the record to suggest that MCA's diiectors breached their
fiduciary duty to the shareholders, the Chancery Court concluded that "the
asserted state law claims are, at best, extremely weak."' 179 But it also found
that the federal claims raised in the federal action, which would have been

169

50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,

516 U.S. 367 (1996).
170 See id. at 648. Matsushita and Wasserman had entered into a separate agreement
pursuant to which Wasserman's MCA shares would not be purchased in the tender offer but
rather would be exchanged, in a tax-free swap, for preferred stock in a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Matsushita. See id. at 647-48. Four additional federal class actions were filed
in the California district court, all of which were consolidated with Epstein. See In re MCA,
1993 WL 43024 at *1 (summarizing the Epstein case). Lew Wasserman and the author are
not related.
171 See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 660.
172 See In re MCA, 598 A.2d at 690.
173 See id.

174

See id.

175 See Epstein F.3d at 660 (noting the absence of a "monetary benefit for class
members").
176 See id.
177

See id.

178

See In re MCA, 598 A.2d at 691. Before the hearing was held, the tender offer was

successfully completed and MCA merged into a Matsushita subsidiary. See id.
179id. at 694.
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released as part of the state settlement, "clearly ha[d] arguable merit."' 180
Noting the "illusionary" value of the revised poison pill and lack of any "real
monetary benefit" to the class members, the court rejected the settlement
agreement. 81' Because the federal claims pressed in Epstein were the only
claims with any "substantial merit," the Chancery Court concluded that it
would be "unfair to compel the release of the federal claims by approving the
182
settlement in its present form."'
Just weeks before the Delaware Chancery Court refused to approve the
settlement, the federal district court in California denied the Epstein plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.18 3 Months later, it dismissed one of the federal
claims, finding that no private right of action existed under SEC Rule lOb13.184 After denying a second motion for class certification, the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining federal
claims. 185 The Epstein plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The state action had been dormant for over a year following the Chancery
Court's rejection of the proposed settlement. 86 But after the federal district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants and while the federal
appeal was pending, the parties in the Delaware action submitted a second
settlement proposal. This proposal offered the class $2 million in cash less any
award of attorneys' fees. 87 Class members were afforded the opportunity to
opt out, but only eighteen of 25,000 shareholders did. 88 Reiterating its
conclusion that the state claims were "extremely weak" and finding, in light of
the district court's action, that the federal claims had only "minimal economic
value," the court found the recovery offered to the class "adequate (if only
barely so) to support the proposed settlement."' 89 Acknowledging that
"suspicions [of collusion between class counsel and the defendant] abound,"
the court nevertheless approved the settlement, concluding that

180 Id.at 695.
"'j See id. at 696.
182 Id.
183 See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 11740, 1993 WL 43024, at *2

(Feb. 16, 1993), aff'd, 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993).
184 See id.
185 See id.

186See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 660.
187 See In re MCA, 1993 WL 43024, at *3.
188 See id.

Relatives of the Epstein plaintiffs were among the objectors. See id.

Presumably Epstein himself did not object in state court for fear that he would be bound, in
the federal action, by a determination by the Delaware court that the representation by the
named representative in the state action was adequate. See supra notes 157-61 and
accompanying text.
"89Id. at *4.
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"[s]uspicion ... is not enough."' 90

The Supreme Court of Delaware

affirmed. 191
Two years after the Delaware Chancery Court approved the second
settlement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
entry of summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs were
entitled to partial summary judgment on the Rule 14d-10 claim regarding
Wasserman. 92 Of course, if the Delaware settlement precluded the federal
class members from pressing their exclusively federal claims, this holding
would have been meaningless for the parties. But the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Delaware judgment approving the settlement did not preclude the
federal claims raised in Epstein.193 The court noted that other courts had
applied an issue preclusion test to determine the effect of a state court
judgment approving a settlement on exclusively federal claims.194 Under this
test, "a state court may release exclusively federal claims that would have been
extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state
claims."' 95 Without deciding whether to follow this test, the court resolved not
"to break new ground in giving preclusive effect to a state court judgment that
extinguishes exclusively federal claims that are factually unrelated to the state
claims pleaded in the class action."' 96 Although the federal and state claims
presented in the two actions arose out of the same transaction-Matsushita's
acquisition of MCA-the court concluded that they were based upon different
underlying facts and therefore, the federal claims were not precluded by the
judgment in the state action. 197
The Ninth Circuit also refused to give effect to the release as a matter of
contract law. 198 Distinguishing cases filed by individual litigants, who may
release whatever claims they choose in settling non-class litigation, the court
emphasized that class members are bound by a settlement without having

190 Id. at *5. The court awarded $250,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses, a fraction of
the $691,058 sought. See id. at *5 -*6.
'91See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 633 A.2d 370, 370 (Del. 1993).
192See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 657 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing and remanding
the district court's order), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367 (1996).
193 See id. at 668.

194See id, at 662-64 (discussing Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553

(3d Cir.), Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1991), and TBK
Partners,Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1982)).

195Id. at 664; see also id. at 663 ( "'[I]f a judgment after trial cannot extinguish claims
not asserted in the class action complaint, a judgment approving a settlement in such an
action ordinarily should not be able to do so either."') (quoting National Super Spuds, Inc.
v. New York Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18 (2d Cir. 1981)).
196 Id. at 664 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
1 See id. at 664-66.
198 See id. at 666-67.
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individually consented to its terms. 199 The class representatives, who give the

consent on behalf of the absent class members, "lack the 'power to give a
release of the class rights' on their own, absent judicial approval of the release
and entry of a judgment. '200 Moreover, a state court cannot require absent
class members "to contractually release their exclusively federal claims in
order to enjoy the benefits of a state class action, when the court has no
jurisdictional power to dispose of those'20 claims
either directly or indirectly
1
through the doctrine of issue preclusion.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's ruling. 20 2 The Court began with the proposition that under the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, 20 3 the Delaware judgment approving the settlement
was entitled to the same respect in federal court that it would have received in
the Delaware courts. 20 4 The Court applied the two-step framework employed
in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons20 5 in deciding
whether the Delaware judgment precluded the exclusively federal claims of the
Epstein plaintiffs. 20 6 First, the Court looked to Delaware law to ascertain the
preclusive effect of the judgment. 20 7 Because Delaware courts had not
considered the preclusive effect of a state judgment in a subsequent action that
could be brought only in federal court, the Court turned for guidance to the
"general state law on the preclusive force of settlement judgments." 20 8
Discussing several Delaware opinions, the Court concluded that "a Delaware
court would afford preclusive effect to the settlement judgment in this case,
notwithstanding the fact that respondents could not have pressed their
199See id.

("[T]he settlement of a class action is fundamentally different from the

settlement of traditional litigation [involving individual plaintiffs].").
200 Id. at 667 (quoting National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 660
F.2d 9, 18 (2d Cir. 1981)).
201 Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court abused its discretion in denying
the Epstein plaintiffs' motion for class certification. See id. at 668-69 (finding that "[t]his
case fits the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) like a glove").
202 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice
Thomas's opinion. See id. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed separate opinions
concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id.
203 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
204 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373,375.
205 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
206 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 375 (citing Marrese, 470 U.S. at 381-83). The Marrese
"analytical framework" provides that in determining whether a state court judgment
precludes an exclusively federal claim, a court must first look to state preclusion law. If
state law would accord the state judgment preclusive effect, the court must determine
whether the federal statute that created the federal claim expressly or implicitly repealed
§ 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Statute. See id.
207 See id. at 375-79.
208 Id. at 375 (citing Marrese, 470 U.S. at 382-83 n.2).
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Exchange Act claims in the Court of Chancery. 2 °9
Second, because Delaware law indicated that the claim would be barred
from litigation in a Delaware court, the Court had to determine whether, "'as
an exception to § 1738,' it 'should refuse to give preclusive effect to [the] state
court judgment."' 210 The Court phrased the issue as "whether § 27 of the
Exchange Act, 211 which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts
for suits arising under the Act, partially repealed § 1738."212 Because § 27, the
exclusive jurisdiction section, does not mention § 1738, the Court had to
consider whether § 27 impliedly created an exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Statute. 21 3 In analyzing this question, the Court focused on the concerns
underlying the grant of exclusive jurisdiction, the intent of Congress, 214 and
whether an "irreconcilable conflict" existed between § 27 of the Exchange Act
and the Full Faith and Credit Statute. 215 The Court found nothing in § 27 to
suggest that Congress intended to "'contravene the common-law rules of
preclusion or to repeal [§ 1738]."'216 Nor did it find any intent to prevent state
court litigants "from voluntarily releasing [their] Exchange Act claims in [a]
judicially approved settlement .... 1,217 Finally, the Court found that the
exception to § 1738 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction did not apply because
the Delaware court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the state claims
218
in the underlying suit.
In separate opinions, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg stated that they would
have remanded to the Ninth Circuit for an initial determination of the content
of Delaware preclusion law. 219 Further, Justice Stevens noted that the "Ninth
Circuit remains free to consider whether Delaware courts fully and fairly
litigated the adequacy of class representation, ' 220 an issue the Epstein plaintiffs
209

Id. at 378 (relying on Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1106 (Del. 1989),

In re Union Square Assocs. Secs. Litig., C.A. No. 11028, 1993 WL 220528, at *3 (Del. Ch.
June 16, 1993), and In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 691-92 (Del. Ch.
1991)).
211 Id. at 375 (quoting Marrese, 470 U.S. at 383).
211

15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).

212 Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 380.

213 See id. (finding that because § 27 does not expressly refer to § 1738, "any
modification of § 1738 by § 27 must be implied").
214 See id. (citing Marrese, 470 U.S. at 386).
211 See id. at 381 (stating that to find an implied repeal of § 1738 by § 27, there must be
an "irreconcilable conflict" between the two statutes, a "relatively stringent standard")
(citations omitted).
216 Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980)).
217 id.

218 See id. at 386-87.
219 See id. at 387 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 394-95
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg
elaborated on this point by stressing the "centrality of the procedural due process protection
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Epstein H
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concluded that the Delaware

judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because it violated the due
process rights of the absent class members to adequate representation. 223 The
court first rejected the argument that the Supreme Court's decision in
Matsushita failed to leave this issue open on remand. 224 The court then
considered whether the Delaware settlement judgment precluded the Epstein
plaintiffs "from 'relitigating' the issue of adequacy of representation under
Delaware issue preclusion law. '225 The Ninth Circuit decided that the Epstein
plaintiffs were not precluded because "the issue of adequacy of representation
was not litigated during the settlement proceedings. ' 226 The court continued:

Even if adequacy of representation had actually been litigated by
objectors at the fairness hearing, and even if Delaware law would allow
an individual objector to bind an absentee on the issue of adequacy of
representation-however improbable that might seem-we still could not
give full faith and credit to such a judgment because it would violate due
process of law . . . . "[O]bjectors are objectors, not class
representatives." Binding absentees to any part of a class action judgment
of adequate representation in class-action lawsuits." Id. at 399 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter joined in this portion of
Justice Ginsburg's opinion.
221See id. at 388-89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
although the Ninth Circuit decided the case without reaching the issue, the Epstein plaintiffs
argued that they were not adequately represented by the Delaware representatives).
222 Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Epstein IF'), withdrawn and
substituted, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). See Kahan & Silberman, The Inadequate Search,
supra note 58, at 786-92, for a critique of Epstein H.
223 See Epstein 11, 126 F.3d at 1255-56 (finding that the Delaware judgment deprives the
Epstein plaintiffs of their due process rights because of the "disabling conflict" of interest
between the Delaware counsel and the class).
224 See id. at 1238-40. In particular, the Ninth Circuit relied on footnote five of the
majority opinion in Matsushita, in which the Court noted that it was not addressing the due
process question: "We need not address the due process claim [of inadequate
representation] . . . because it is outside the scope of the question presented in this Court."
Id. at 1238 (quoting Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 379 n.5). The Ninth Circuit also relied on
Justice Ginsburg's separate opinion, which stated that the issue of adequacy of
representation "remain[s] open for airing on remand." Id. at 1239 (quoting Matsushita, 516
U.S. at 399 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
225 Id. at 1240.
226 Id. In support of this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that the notice to absent
class members did not list the adequacy of the named plaintiffs or their counsel as an issue
to be presented at the hearing. See id. Thus, the absent class members lacked notice that
they could have objected to the adequacy of representation at the settlement hearing. See id.
In addition, the Delaware Vice Chancellor did not make a finding, supported by reason and
evidence, that the requirements of the Delaware class action rule were satisfied. See id. at
1241 n.6.
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"is an act of judicial power," and that power can only be exercised over
absentees when their interests have, in fact, been
adequately represented
227

by parties lawfully authorized to represent them.
Thus, while the objectors themselves would have been bound by a
determination that the representation was adequate, the absent class members
who had not authorized the objectors to represent them were not so bound. 22 8
Finally, on the "merits" of the adequacy question, the Ninth Circuit, in Epstein
H, concluded that class counsel had not adequately represented the interests of
229
the absent class members.
Upon rehearing, a "reconstituted" panel of the Ninth Circuit2 30 withdrew the
earlier panel's opinion and ruled instead that the Epstein plaintiffs were bound
by the Delaware judgment releasing the exclusively federal claims.23' The
Epstein III panel rejected the earlier panel's ruling that the due process
question had been left open by the Supreme Court on remand, finding that
Matsushita was "explicitly and implicitly premised upon the validity of the
Delaware judgment" under due process.2 32 Even if the due process issue were
left open, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "absent class
members' due process right to adequate representation is protected not by

227

Id. at 1241 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

228

See id. at 1242 (ruling that the "appearance [of individual objectors] at the hearing did

not bind anyone but themselves to an adjudication of adequacy of representation"). The
court also rejected the argument that the absent class members had a duty to intervene to
protect their rights, and having failed to do so, were barred from collaterally attacking the
adequacy of representation. See id. at 1242-44. Further, the court found that the mere
existence of procedures like Rule 23 does not foreclose an absentee from raising the issue of
adequacy of representation in a collateral attack. See id. at 1245-48.
229 See id. at 1250-55 (noting the "disabling conflict" of interest between class counsel
and the class, and the counsel's willingness to "basically 'roll[] over' during settlement
negotiations").
230 Two days after the Ninth Circuit decided Epstein H upon remand from the Supreme
Court, Judge Norris, the author of that opinion, resigned from the court. See Epstein v.
MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 643-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 497 (1999) ("Epstein
llr'). Matsushita then filed a petition for rehearing. See id. at 644. Judge Thomas replaced
Judge Norris and the reconstituted panel granted the petition for rehearing. See id. Judge
O'Scannlain, who dissented in Epstein H, wrote the court's opinion in Epstein III. See id. at
642. Judge Wiggins, who had joined the majority in Epstein I, switched sides and
concurred in the result in Epstein III. See id. at 650 (Wiggins, C.J., concurring in the result).
Judge Thomas, who was not part of the original panel, dissented from the substituted
decision. See id. at 651 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
231 See id. at 650 (ruling that "the Delaware judgment was not constitutionally infirm and
must be accorded full faith and credit").
232 Id. at 644. Judge Wiggins, who concurred in the result, found that "while the
Supreme Court did not conclusively resolve the due process issue before the remand, it did
send unmistakable signals on that very issue." Id. at 650 (Wiggins, C.J., concurring in the
result).
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collateral review, but by the certifying court initially, and thereafter by appeal
within the state system and by direct review in the United States Supreme
' 23 3
Court.
Relying on a sentence from Hansberry v. Lee, 234 the court
concluded that "[d]ue process requires that an absent class member's right to

adequate representation be protected by the adoption of the appropriate
procedures by the certifying court and by the courts that review its
determinations; due process does not require collateral second-guessing of
those determinations and that review. ' 235 Thus, the absent class members were
bound because the Delaware court had found that the representation was
236
adequate.

Such waffling by the Ninth Circuit on the due process question reveals an
initial flaw in the majority's opinion in Matsushita: its apparent failure to make
clear that the due process issue remained open on remand. While the Supreme
Court expressly declined to address the due process issue,237 it failed to make
sufficiently clear that the issue remained open on remand to the Ninth Circuit.
More importantly, the Court should have clarified that even a determination by
the Delaware courts that class representation was adequate would not have
barred absent class members from collaterally attacking the judgment for lack
of due process. Put differently, the Court should have reiterated what it has
stated before, that class action judgments may be collaterally attacked by
absent class members if they were not adequately represented 238---even if the
239
rendering court has found the representation to be adequate.
Matsushita not only failed to clarify the availability and scope of a due
process challenge on remand, but it apparently mistakenly determined the

233 Id. at 648 (citations omitted); see also id. at 651 (Wiggins, C.J., concurring).
234 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) ("[Tjhere has been a failure of due process only in those cases

where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the
interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.").
235 Epstein 111, 179 F.3d at 648.
236 See id. at 651(Wiggins, C.J., concurring).
233 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.5 (1996) ("We need
not address the due process claim, however, because it is outside the scope of the question
presented in this Court.") (citations omitted).
238 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-46 (1940); accord Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474
F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing absent class members to collaterally attack judgment
on the ground of inadequate representation even though absent class members' counsel was
aware of the suit and could have intervened).
239 Professors Kahan and Silberman conclude that "[w]hen class members have an
opportunity to object to the settlement and to opt out of it, there is little reason to allow a
party who refuses to avail itself of these opportunities to attack the settlement collaterally."
Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 61, at 268. But absent class
members may not realize that the representation is inadequate before the opt-out period
expires. Furthermore, even if they realize it by the time the settlement is presented for
judicial approval, they should not be compelled to raise their objections in what may be a
distant, inconvenient court to preserve their right to sue.
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content of Delaware preclusion law. The Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Nottingham Partners v. Dana,240 on which Justice Thomas relied for the
proposition that Delaware courts would accord preclusive effect to the
settlement judgment, adopted the following issue preclusion test: "'a court may
permit the release of a claim based on the identicalfactual predicate as that

underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the claim was not
presented and might not have been presentable in the class action."' 241 The
Nottingham court did not say, however, that it would go further and permit the
release of a claim based on the same transaction or occurrence. 242 Yet, as
Justice Ginsburg noted, "[i]n its endeavor to forecast Delaware preclusion law,
the Court appears to have blended the 'identical factual predicate' test applied
by the Delaware Supreme Court ... with the broader 'same transaction' test
243
advanced by Matsushita."
Thus, the Court's opinion in Matsushita, ostensibly based on Delaware
preclusion law, goes further than the Delaware Supreme Court likely would
have gone in according the settlement preclusive effect. In determining the
effect of state court settlements on exclusively federal claims, future courts
should pay more careful attention to the difference between the issue
preclusion, or "identical factual predicate," test and the "same transaction" test.
questions of state
Federal courts should consider certifying unsettled
244
preclusion law to the state's highest court for decision.
What impact will Matsushita have on the phenomenon of dueling class
actions? In placing its imprimatur on state court settlements that release
exclusively federal claims, and in misreading Delaware preclusion law,
Matsushita likely will increase the sheer number of federal/state dueling class
actions and the concomitant problems. The Court's emphasis on state
preclusion law will add an important factor for consideration in forum
selection. While casting light on the general approach to be taken when
preclusion issues arise in the dueling class action context, Matsushita left
unresolved many of the specific and difficult preclusion questions that arise in
240

564 A.2d 1089 (Del. 1989).

4I Id. at 1106 (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460
(2d Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added); see also National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York

Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "[w]e assume that a
settlement could properly be framed so as to prevent class members from subsequently
asserting claims relying on a legal theory different from that relied upon in the class action
complaint but depending upon the very same set offacts") (emphasis added); Abramson v.
Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "where both the state
and federal suits are based on the same transactions, collateral estoppel would apply with
regard to the facts determined in the state action") (emphasis added).
242 See Nottingham Partners,564 A.2d at 1107 ( affirming the Vice Chancellor's finding

that "both actions arose under the same set of operative facts").
243 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 395 n.4 (1996).
244 Three-fourths of the states now have certification procedures in place. See CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 334 & n.57 (5th ed. 1994).
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such circumstances. Among these is the critical question of whether objectors
are free to challenge the adequacy of representation in collateral
proceedings.2 45 Ultimately, Matsushita illustrates the difficulty courts have in
striking the proper balance between the rights of absent class members, on the
one hand, and the need for finality, efficiency and consistency, on the other.

IV.

THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING JUDICIAL TOOLS

Courts already have a variety of techniques for eliminating or reducing the
problems associated with duplicative litigation. Although each of these
devices may be useful in the dueling class actions context, none is adequateeither alone or in conjunction with others-to ameliorate all of the problems
posed by dueling class actions.
A. Transfer and Consolidation

If all dueling class actions filed on behalf of the same class could be
transferred to a single court and consolidated into a single proceeding, a
number of the problems described in Part II would disappear. Surely such
transfer and consolidation would alleviate some of the pressure on class
counsel to settle, 246 while minimizing the waste of resources inherent in
duplicative suits. 247 By eliminating the possibility that more than one lawyer,
or group of lawyers in consolidated actions, could represent the class in court,
consolidation would also eliminate the possibility that the defendant could
conduct a "reverse auction. 248 Furthermore, by reducing the pressure on class
counsel to settle quickly, consolidation would enable class counsel to obtain
the discovery necessary to assess the strength and value of the class claims and
would reduce the likelihood that class counsel would withhold relevant
information from the class. 249 Likewise, consolidation would greatly reduce or
eliminate the possibility that class members would be confused by notices they
receive in different class actions. 250 Moreover, by decreasing the pressure on
245 Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 379 n.5 (declining to consider the due process claim "because
it is outside the scope of the question presented in this Court").

246 See supra Part II.A. The interests of class counsel and the absent class members in

reaching an early settlement would continue to diverge, however. See supra notes 79-82
and accompanying text (noting that even in a single, or consolidated, class action suit, class
counsel is likely to settle early because class members have insufficient incentive to closely
monitor class counsel, and counsel is still motivated to lock in a high fee without expending
a lot of time or money).
247 See supra Part IJ.C (discussing the waste of judicial resources and parties' money in

adjudicating dueling class actions).
248 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
249 This risk would not be eliminated as the class counsel's incentive in gaining judicial
approval of the settlement would be greater than her interest in affording the class complete
information. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 84-86 and accompanying text (arguing that class members who choose
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class counsel to settle early, consolidation would increase the amount of
information available to the court. 25 ' Finally, consolidation of all suits filed on
problems that arise
behalf of the same class would eliminate the preclusion
252
when one of the dueling class actions reaches judgment.
Transfer and consolidation only work, however, when all dueling class
actions are pending in the courts of a single jurisdiction. If all dueling class
actions are filed in the courts of a single state, for instance, ordinarily they can
be consolidated in a single proceeding. 253 Likewise, if all dueling class actions
are filed in federal court-albeit in different judicial districts-transfer to a
single district followed by consolidation should be available. Two principal
mechanisms are available in federal court. First, pursuant to § 1404(a), a class
action may be transferred to the district in which a dueling class action is
pending "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice," if the transferee court is one in which the suit "might have been
brought" originally. 254 Once the dueling class actions are transferred to a
single judicial district, they can be consolidated as long as they "involv[e] a

to opt out of the first suit may be confused by the notice of the second suit and disregard the
second notice, thereby failing to opt out of a separate class action entirely).
251See supra Part II.B.3 (arguing that pressure to settle on the class counsel acts as an
incentive not to disseminate information to the court).
252 See supra Part II.D (describing the complex and time-consuming preclusion issues in
dueling class actions). Because all suits filed on behalf of the same class would be
consolidated into one, the question of the preclusive effect the first suit would have on
competing suits would not arise.
253 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048(a) (West 1980) (same as Federal Rule 42(a));
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 1973 & Supp. 1997) (permitting coordination of "civil

actions sharing a common question of fact or law ...pending in different courts" if the
actions are "complex"); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(a) (same as Federal Rule 42(a)); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1006 (West 1993) (permitting consolidation of actions pending in
the same court "as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a
substantial right"); ILL. CT. R. 384 (permitting transfer of civil actions pending in different
judicial circuits if they "involv[e] one or more common questions of fact or law" and if
"consolidation would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and would promote
the just and efficient conduct of such actions"); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 602(a) (McKinney 1976)
(similar to Federal Rule 42(a)); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 602(b) (McKinney 1976) (permitting the
supreme court to "remove to itself an action pending in another court and consolidate it...
with that in the supreme court"); PA. R. Civ. P. 213(a) (similar to Federal Rule 42(a)); TEX.
GOv'T CODE ANN. § 74.12 1(a) (West 1998) (permitting certain intracounty transfers); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 174(a) (same as Federal Rule 42(a)).
254 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1993). The Supreme Court has stated that, "'[i]f when a suit is
commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes of
defendant, it is a district "where [the action] might have been brought" [under § 1404(a)]."'
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) (1993) (permitting transfer of an action filed in the wrong district "if it be in the
interest of justice ... to any district. . . in which it could have been brought").
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common question of law or fact, '255 a quite permissive standard.
Second, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has the authority to
transfer "civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact...
pending in different districts ... to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings .... for the convenience of parties and witnesses and [to]
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. '256 Although the
multidistrict litigation statute ("MDL") contemplates remand of the cases to
the transferor court at the conclusion of the pretrial proceedings, 257 the
transferee court ultimately disposes of most MDL cases, either by way of
dispositive motion, settlement, 258 or trial. 259 Thus, dueling class actions filed
in the federal system likely can be resolved together unless a trial is required.
Although transfer and consolidation vehicles can alleviate most problems
associated with dueling class actions filed within a single judicial system, these
tools are currently unavailable when the dueling class actions are filed in
different jurisdictions.
The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act in
1991260 to "provide for the transfer of litigation from a court in one judicial
system to a court in another judicial system."'261 Adoption of the Act would
have "enable[d] courts of a state to make and receive transfers in cooperation
with any other court, state, federal, or foreign. '262 The Act has yet to be
263
enacted in any state.

255 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
256 28 U.S.C. §

1407(a) (1993).

257See id. (stating that "[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated").
258 See, e.g., Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to MultidistrictLitigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 480
(1989) (noting the "great success of the transferee judges in terminating by settlement,
summary judgment, or other type of dismissal, the actions assigned to them by the Panel");
Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on MultidistrictLitigation, Transferor Courts and
Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 583 (1978) (noting that "less than five percent of the
actions transferred by the Panel have been remanded").
259 The Supreme Court recently held that a transferee court can no longer invoke §
1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (stating that "none of the arguments raised
can unsettle the straightforward language [of § 1407(a)] imposing the Panel's responsibility
to remand, which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court"). For a
discussion of proposed legislation to alter the result in Lexecon, see infra Part V.A.4.
260

See UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT, 14 U.L.A. 189, 189 (Supp. 1999) (Historical

Notes). For the complete text of the Act, see id. at 191-210.
261 Id. at 189 (Prefatory Note).
262

Id. at 190.

263 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that no state had enacted the Act as
of June 9, 1999). Transfer under the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act would require the
consent of both the transferring and receiving courts. See § 102, 14 U.L.A. at 192 ("A
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Likewise, the American Law Institute ("ALI")'s Complex Litigation Project
made statutory recommendations for a variety of vehicles to facilitate transfer
and consolidation of actions pending in federal and state courts simultaneously.
One example is a proposal to expand removal jurisdiction to permit state suits
transactionally related to a pending federal action to be removed and
transferred to federal court.264 Other proposals provide for the transfer of
federal actions to state court for consolidation with related actions pending
there 265 and the formulation of an interstate transfer mechanism.2 66 Unless and
until these proposals are adopted, however, transfer and consolidation can only
alleviate the problems associated with dueling class actions pending in courts
in the same judicial system.
B.

Injunctions

A court entertaining a class action may, in some circumstances, enjoin the
parties from initiating additional suits or prosecuting dueling actions
previously filed. Like consolidation of dueling class actions filed on behalf of
the same class, an injunction enjoining the parties (and absent class members)
from commencing or prosecuting dueling class actions would reduce or
eliminate many of the problems described in Part II. Nevertheless, a variety of
concerns limit the injunction's utility.
To begin with, both the language of Rule 23 and the due process clause
strongly suggest that courts entertaining class actions seeking monetary relief
cannot enjoin absent class members from presenting their claims in other
proceedings.
Rule 23(c)(2) affords members of a 23(b)(3) class the
opportunity to opt out of the class action. 267 Although not explicitly assuring
class members the opportunity to sue independently,2 68 the provision implies
[designate] court of this State ...may transfer all or part of the action to a court not of this
State which consents to the transfer ....). The ALl proposes a markedly different
approach to interstate transfer and consolidation. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the ALI's
proposal to create an Interstate Complex Litigation Panel composed of judges from
participating states who would determine whether to transfer and consolidate actions
pending in more than one state).
264 See

AMERICAN

LAW

INSTITUTE,

COMPLEX

LITIGATION:

STATUTORY

RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 5.01(a), at 220-21(1994) [hereinafter ALl COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT] (stating that "the Complex Litigation Panel may order the removal to
federal court and consolidation of one or more civil actions pending in one or more state
courts, if the removed actions arise from the same transaction [or] occurrence").
265 See id. § 4.01, at 177-78 (allowing the Complex Litigation Panel to designate a state
court as the transferee court based on various factors such as the location where the
controversy arose, fairness to the parties, and appropriateness of the state court in relation to
other possible transferee courts).
266 See id. § 4.02, at 201 (stating that "consideration should be given to the formulation
of an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform Complex Litigation Act").
23(c)(2), (b)(2).
268See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507,
267 FED. R. Civ. P.
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Court stated that due process guarantees absent class members, seeking wholly
or predominately monetary relief, an opportunity to opt out. 270 Since the right
to opt out and sue independently need not include the right to sue on behalf of
a class, 271 these concerns alone should not limit the utility of an injunction
against dueling class actions.
Other concerns, however, are more difficult to overcome. Principles of
federalism and comity greatly restrict courts' authority to enjoin parallel
proceedings in the federal/state and state/state contexts. 272 In the federal/state
cases, the Anti-Injunction Act 273 bars federal courts from enjoining

proceedings already pending in a state court "except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.

2 74

The Supreme Court has admonished that "[a]ny

555 (1987) (questioning whether the right to opt out necessarily "entails full and absolute
freedom to conduct duplicative litigation ... It might be argued ... that it is only exclusion
from the class, and not the right to pursue one's own suit independently, that is guaranteed
by the Rule"); see also In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775. 781 (3d Cir.
1975).
269 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

270 See id. at 812 (stating that "we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an

absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by
executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court"). Twice
the Supreme Court accepted cases raising the question whether due process assures absent
class members a right to opt out of any class action asserting monetary claims, but
ultimately dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. See Adams v. Robertson, 520
U.S. 83, 88-89 (1997) (stating that a court may have read the section dealt with in Shutts as
barring personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, not the broader mandate of due
process requiring that all members have the right to opt out of the class); Ticor Title Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 124 (1994).
271Accord Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding
an injunction against a competing class action filed in state court, while recognizing class
members' rights to opt out and sue individually).
272 In the federal/federal cases, courts ordinarily apply the first-in-time rule as a matter of
comity: the court entertaining the class action filed first-in-time has authority to enjoin the
parties from initiating or prosecuting duplicative cases. See Sherman, supra note 268, at
518-519; cf Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand, Nos. 90 C 7173, 91 C 1809, 91 C 1955, 90 B
15485, 91 A 169, 1991 WL 154460, *8 n.6 (N.D. Il1. July 30, 1991) (stating that when
"there has been a race to the courthouse to file the first class action in what appears to be a
promising situation ... no automatic 'first in time, first in right' presumption is called for in
choosing the proper class representative and class counsel").
273 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

274 Id. The statute, however, does not bar a federal court from enjoining parties from
instituting state proceedings. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965)
(explaining that § 2283 only bars an already instituted suit, not injunctions against all state
court proceedings); see also 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 4222 (2d ed. 1999 Supp.) (explaining that a federal court can issue an
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doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court
proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to

275
proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy."
None of the three exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act authorize federal
courts to enjoin dueling class actions pending in state court absent special
circumstances. A federal statute need not expressly refer to the Act, nor
expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding to qualify under
the "expressly authorized" exception. 276 But the statute "must have created a
specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of
equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to
enjoin a state court proceeding. 27 7 No federal statute governing class actions
278
generally qualifies under this exception.
The Supreme Court in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.279 narrowly

injunction restraining a party from commencing state proceedings).
275 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
297 (1970); see also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (describing the Act as an "absolute prohibition against any injunction of any statecourt proceedings").
276 See Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 633 (stating that the absence of express language is not
determinative if there is adequate evidence that Congress intended to authorize an injunction
of state court proceedings); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972) (stating that to
qualify under the "expressly authorized" exception, a federal law does not have to
specifically reference that statute); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman
Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955) (admitting that there is no formula for the "expressly
authorized" exception and that an authorization need not refer expressly to § 2283); see also
17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4224 (explaining that §2283 has been read to be
implied in carrying out Congress' acts).
277 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 237.
278 The only authorities that might be relied upon are Rule 23(b) and (c), which
contemplate mandatory federal class actions with no opportunity to opt out, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2), and Rule 23(d), which authorizes the district court to make
appropriate orders to manage the case. FED R. Civ. P. 23(d). But because Federal Rules are
not Acts of Congress, the first exception is unavailable. See, e.g., In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 144 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating that "Rule 23(b)(3) does not constitute a predicate act of Congress exempting this
action from the Anti-Injunction Act"); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d
Cir. 1985); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Glenn W. Turner
Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 85,§
1798.1 (finding it inappropriate for 23(d) to serve as an express exception to § 2283,
because it is not an Act of Congress) ; Sherman, supra note 268, at 529-30; Sherman, supra
note 101, at 936 & n.49 (stating that there is no express class action exception in Rule 23).
But see Steven M. Larimore, Exploring the Interface Between Rule 23 Class Actions and the
Anti-Injunction Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259, 279-80 (1984) (questioning whether a procedural
rule qualifies as an act of Congress, but arguing for a loose construction of this prong of the
exception).
279 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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interpreted § 2283's "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to authorize injunctions
against pending state actions only when the federal court obtained jurisdiction
over property prior to the state court action. 280 The Court has "never viewed
parallel in personam actions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either
court. ' ' 281 The Eighth Circuit applied this line of cases to class actions in In re
Federal Skywalks, 282 holding that the district court entertaining the federal
class action erred in enjoining pending parallel state court actions. 283 Some
courts since Skywalks have read the Supreme Court precedent a bit more
loosely to make the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception available to a district
court entertaining a class action or other complex case on the verge of
settlement. 284 Although scholars have argued that this exception deserves a

280 See id. at 641-42; see also Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134-35 (1941)

(describing a line of cases holding that "the court, whether federal or state, which first takes
possession of a res withdraws the property from the reach of the other") (citations omitted).
Courts have also invoked this exception in actions removed to federal court to ensure that
the state court proceeds no further with the action. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up
Truck, 134 F.3d at 145; see generally 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 245, § 4225 (analyzing
the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception).
281 Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 642; cf Martin Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute
Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 754 (1977) (arguing that the "in aid of jurisdiction"
exception should be construed "to empower the federal court to enjoin a concurrent state
proceeding that might render the exercise of the federal court's jurisdiction nugatory").
282 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
283 See id. at 1182-83. The court also rejected the argument that the district court had
authority to enjoin the state actions because the situation was analogous to federal
interpleader. See id. at 1182. Even though the defendant might have been required to pay
only one punitive damage award, the claim did not qualify as a limited fund, which was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to interpleader. See id. It is unclear from the opinion whether the
state actions were filed on behalf of a class or individuals.
284 See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201-04 (3d Cir. 1993);
Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990);
Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881-82 (11th Cir. 1989); In re BaldwinUnited Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335-38 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134
F.R.D. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 85, § 1798.1.
Perhaps the best known, In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d at 328, upheld an
injunction against parallel proceedings where the parties to the federal class action had
signed stipulations of settlement after two years of judicial involvement in settlement
negotiations, and after the court had scheduled a fairness hearing. See id. at 338. The
Second Circuit reasoned that, had the settlements been finally approved and judgment
entered, the district court clearly would have had authority to enjoin the commencement of a
parallel action. See id. at 336. The court further determined that such an injunction "would
properly have forestalled relitigation of those judgments." Id. Although the settlements
here had not yet been finally approved, the potential state suit "threatened to 'seriously
impair the federal court's flexibility and authority' to approve settlements in the multidistrict litigation." Id. (quoting Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
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broader interpretation, 285 under current case law, the mere pendency of dueling
286
class actions does not justify an injunction under the second exception.
The third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act permits a federal court to
enjoin pending state proceedings "to protect or effectuate its judgments. 2 87 In
other words, a court may enjoin a state court from re-litigating matters that
were fully adjudicated in federal court. 288 Thus, when a federal court enters a

Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970)). In an effort to reconcile its decision with Vendo, the
Second Circuit concluded that
[T]he need to enjoin conflicting state proceedings arises because the jurisdiction of a
multidistrict court is "analogous to that of a court in an in rem action or in a school
desegregation case, where it is intolerable to have conflicting orders from different
courts."... In effect.., the district court had before it a class action proceeding so far
advanced that it was the virtual equivalent of a res over which the district court
required full control.

Id. at 337 (quoting 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4225).
In addition, federal courts that have retained jurisdiction to supervise implementation of
their orders have invoked the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to enjoin state actions that
would interfere with that implementation. For instance, courts exercising continuing
jurisdiction in school desegregation and legislative reapportionment cases have issued antisuit injunctions. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383,
384 (4th Cir. 1974) (concluding that injunction relief was necessary and thus, a proper
exception to § 2283); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 1104, 1107-08 (W.D.
Mich. 1981) (explaining that the court's desire for prompt desegregation, the need to
prevent contrary rulings and the prevention of relitigation of issues all allow for an
exception to § 2283); Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149, 163 (N.D. Okla. 1963) (holding
that the lawsuit may not be brought elsewhere because of the need for effective adjudication
and harmonious state-federal relations), aff'd, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); see also 17 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 274, § 4225.
285 See, e.g., Larimore, supra note 278, at 292-94 (advocating a more expansive view of
the exception "that properly redirects the focus of the necessary-in-aid exception toward the
need for an injunction in any particular case"); Redish, supra note 281, at 754 (suggesting
that "whenever a federal court has jurisdiction in a case before it, the exception should be
construed to empower the federal court to enjoin a concurrent state proceeding that might
render the exercise of the federal court's jurisdiction nugatory") (footnote omitted);
Sherman, supra note 268, at 548 (advocating a "functional analysis that weighs the degree
of invasion of state interest against the efficiency and purpose of unitary federal
resolution"); 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4225 (arguing that "it should be
permissible for a federal court to enjoin state proceedings that would interfere with efficient
disposition of a federal class action"); cf Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism:
A Proposalfor Reform of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 319 (advocating
that the Act be rewritten to "codify the general policies that have always governed federal
court injunctions against state court proceedings").
286 See Carlough, 10 F.3d at 202; In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir.
1988); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 903 F. Supp. 16, 18 (W.D.N.C.
1995); Waldron v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 124 F.R.D. 235, 238 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
287 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
288 See Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1987)
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final judgment in a class action, it may enjoin dueling class actions pending in
state court that raise the same claim on behalf of the same class. The utility of
such an injunction in minimizing the problems posed by dueling class actions
is obviously very limited, as authority to enter it does not arise until the federal
court enters a "judgment." 289 By this time, scarce resources already will have
been wasted, the pressure to settle already will have been brought to bear and
informational deficiencies already will have had their effect. 290 Moreover, in
determining whether to issue an injunction at this point, the federal court will
have to confront daunting preclusion problems arising in connection with
291
dueling class actions.
Even if a court issues an injunction against pending state suits, its scope
may be narrow. The circuits are split on whether the re-litigation exception
protects the full claim preclusive effect of the federal judgment or only those
matters that actually were decided by the federal court.2 92 Under the narrower

(stating that the 1948 exception to "protect or effectuate its judgments" was added to allow
enjoining matters already adjudicated in federal court).
289 The Second Circuit has held that the relitigation exception authorizes federal courts to
enter injunctions protecting "interlocutory as well as final decrees." Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating that "[nlothing in the concluding
phrase of 2283 ...limits its scope to final judgments"). Although other courts have paid
only "polite lip service" to this decision, 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4226, Wright
and Miller suggest that the term "judgments" in the Act should be read to include orders
from which an appeal would lie, including truly final judgments, preliminary injunctions,
partial summary judgments made final and appealable by the Rule 54(b) procedure, and
orders appealable under the Cohen collateral order doctrine, but not orders certified for
discretionary interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. at 550-51. Until recently,
orders denying class certification were not final appealable orders, however, and thus a
federal court that denied class certification could not invoke the relitigation exception to
enjoin a dueling class action filed in state court. See, e.g., In re GeneralMotors Corp. Pickup Truck, 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93
F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996). Since December 1998, however, under Rule 23(f), Courts of
Appeals may, in their discretion, permit appeals from orders granting or denying class
certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
290 See supra Part II.A-C.

291 See supra Part II.D. If the state court already has concluded that the federal judgment
is not entitled to preclusive effect, the federal court asked to enjoin the state suit to
"protect... its judgment[]" must give the state court judgment on this issue full faith and
credit. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1986).
292 Compare Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1989)
(adopting restrictive view of exception by finding that the relitigation exception is more
narrowly tailored that res judicata), and Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 524 (5th Cir.
1994) (applying restrictive view in case where plaintiff had been denied opportunity to
amend pleading in federal action to state claim for fraud) with Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa,
958 F.2d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting a broader view, since a narrower view is
contrary to the purposes of § 2283); see also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S.
140, 148-49 (1988); 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4226; George A. Martinez, The
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interpretation, a federal court would lack the authority to enjoin dueling state
class actions that raise claims that were settled rather than decided by the
federal court. 293 Thus, in the common context of the settlement class action,
the third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is unavailable. In summary, the
federal courts' authority to enjoin dueling state class actions is quite limited,
and even when available, may be "too little, too late" to resolve the problems
that plague dueling class actions.
Just as the Anti-Injunction Act bars federal courts from enjoining pending
state court proceedings, the Supremacy Clause 294 along with well-established
common law principles bar state courts from enjoining federal court
proceedings. 295 The only exception recognized by the Supreme Court is when
the state court has custody of property and is proceeding in rem or quasi in
296
rem.

Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 643, 645 (1993) (arguing that the relitigation exception to the Act should be construed

to permit federal courts to protect the full claim preclusive effect of their judgments).
293 See, e.g., Santopadre v. Pelican Homestead & Savings Ass'n, 937 F.2d 268, 273 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that issues were "actually litigated" for purposes of the relitigation
exception only if they were raised by the pleadings and submitted to the trier of fact);
Sanchez v. Sea Containers, Ltd., 874 F.2d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 1989); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11 th Cir. 1983); Summit Design Servs., Inc. v.
La Place Sand Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 317, at *3 (E.D. La. January 8, 1999) (denying
injunction against state litigation that raised same issues as federal action because federal
action was settled rather than litigated); Wolfe v. Safecard Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 648,
649 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (stating that the relitigation exception "allows a federal court to enjoin
a state court proceeding only if the parties to the original action disputed, and the trier of
fact actually resolved, the issues involved in the subsequent case") (citation omitted).
294 U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1.2.

295 See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21 n.24
(1983) (explaining that the Court does not suggest that a state court's injunction could have
prevented the petitioner from instituting the federal action); General Atomic Co. v. Felter,
434 U.S. 12, 12 (1977) (holding that "it is not within the power of state courts to bar
litigants from filing and prosecuting in personam actions in the federal courts"); id. at 17
(stating that "the rights conferred by Congress to bring in personam actions in federal courts
are not subject to abridgment by state-court injunctions, regardless of whether the federal
litigation is pending or prospective"); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964)
(stating that "state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings
in in personam actions"). For a brief discussion of early nineteenth century law on this
issue, see 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274, § 4212 (citing the historical implications that
favor the interpretation of state courts not being allowed to enjoin federal court
proceedings).
296 See Donovan, 377 U.S. at 412 (citing Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 46568 (1939)) (citing exceptions to the general rule that state and federal courts would not
interfere with each other including that the court having custody of property in an in rem or
quasi in rem hearing maintains exclusive jurisdiction over it); see also Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 136 (1941) (stating that "where a state court first acquires
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Just as injunctions are of limited utility in the federal/state context, they fail
to remedy the problems raised by dueling class actions pending in the courts of
more than one state. 97 State courts have consistently held that they lack
authority to enjoin the courts of other states from entertaining duplicative suits
between the same parties. 298 Although state courts may enjoin parties over
whom they have in personam jurisdiction from proceeding with actions
299
pending in the courts of other states, they exercise this power sparingly.
When a state court does issue an injunction, the second state must determine
whether to enforce the injunction in its courts. Although the Full Faith and
Credit Clause 300 and Statute 30 1 might appear to require enforcement of such

control of the res, the federal courts are disabled from exercising any power over it")

(citation omitted).
297 When multiple suits are filed in the courts of a single state, the first-in-time rule

ordinarily applies. See, e.g., First Tennessee Bank, N.A. v. Snell, 718 So. 2d 20, 22 (Ala.
1998) (holding that a "prior-filed class action prevails over a later-filed class action
involving substantially identical class action allegations and requires the abatement of the
later-filed action"); Ex parte Harris, 711 So. 2d 467, 468 (Ala. 1998) (holding that a court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a class action when a substantially identical class
action had been previously filed in another court); Schnell v. Porta Sys. Corp., Civ. A. No.
12,948, 1994 WL 148276, *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1994) (noting a "preference for litigating a
dispute in the first forum chosen").
298 See, e.g., St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins, Co. v. Mentor Corp., 503 N.W.2d 511, 515
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the court that acquires jurisdiction first may dispose
of the entire controversy); State ex rel. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nortoni, 55 S.W.2d
272, 273 (Mo. 1932) (finding that in the case between a foreign tribunal and state court, the
state court may issue an injunction if the foreign court's jurisdiction is unreasonable); 21
C.J.S. Courts § 227 (1990) (explaining that a court that has jurisdiction may enjoin another
action when the same parties are involved); see also White v. Toney, 823 S.W.2d 921, 923
(Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that without addressing the injunction "[tihe pendency of
the Louisiana action on the same subject was no impediment to the exercise of the
[Arkansas] probate court's jurisdiction, since identical cases in different states can be
pending in each court at the same time.").
299 See, e.g., State ex rel. General Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo.
1978) (stating that "the power of one State's court of equity to restrain persons within
control of its process from the prosecution of suits in another State is clear, but on comity
considerations, it should be employed with great caution"); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 227 (1990)
(stating that "a court which has acquired jurisdiction of the parties has power ...to enjoin
them from proceeding with an action in a court of another state.. . with respect to a
controversy between the same parties of which it obtained jurisdiction prior to the foreign
court. This power of a court should be exercised sparingly") (footnotes omitted); Miller,
supra note 2 at 523 (1996) (explaining that courts are usually sensitive to interstate comity
and usually require a convincing reason for an injunction); Sherman, supra note 101, at 92728 (noting the "comity barriers" to interstate injunctions).
300U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I (stating that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the... judicial Proceedings of every other State").
30128 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).

20001

DUELING CLASS ACTIONS

injunctions, some state courts have declined to do so. 302 The Supreme Court
recently acknowledged that it has "not yet ruled on the credit due to a state
'30 3
court injunction barring a party from maintaining litigation in another state.
The Court further noted without criticism that "[s]tate courts that have dealt
with the question have, in the main, regarded anti-suit injunctions as outside
' 3°4
the full faith and credit ambit.
Thus, like the transfer and consolidation vehicles currently in place, the antisuit injunction will help alleviate the problems associated with dueling class
actions only when all of the dueling class actions are pending in the courts of a
single judicial system. Accordingly, the problems that arise in federal/state
and state/state cases cannot be solved by these traditional vehicles.
C. Stays andAbstention
Just as an injunction against all dueling class actions would alleviate many
of the problems that otherwise would occur, stays of all dueling class actions
would have the same beneficial effect. But one cannot expect such stays to
issue in all dueling class actions.
Whenever two or more related suits are pending, each court may stay its
305
own hand in deference to the other proceeding. Typically, in federal/federal
and state/state cases, 30 6 courts apply the first-in-time rule and defer to the
action that was filed first. Likewise, in federal/state cases, state courts
typically will defer to previously filed federal actions. 30 7 All such stays are
302 See, e.g., Disctronics Ltd. v. Disc Mfg., 686 So. 2d 1154, 1162 n.3 (Ala. 1996); Cook

v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 505 A.2d 447, 450 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
303 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998).
31 Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 236 (noting that "antisuit injunctions regarding
litigation elsewhere, even if compatible with due process as a direction constraining parties
to the decree, in fact have not controlled the second court's actions regarding litigation in
that court") (citations and footnote omitted).
305 See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir.
1970) (stating that "in the absence of sound reasons the second action should
the first");William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177,
1969) (holding that the first suit has priority absent a balance of convenience
second action). In federal/federal cases, the court also has the option to
consolidate the proceedings. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
306 See, e.g., Acierno v. New Castle County, 679 A.2d 455, 458 (Del. 1996)

give way to
178 (2d Cir.
favoring the
transfer and
(finding that

the trial court should consider a stay where an action is pending in a court capable of fair
adjudication); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 668 A.2d 67, 72 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716,
723 (Tex. App. 1992). But see St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Mentor Corp., 503 N.W.2d
511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the first-in-time rule "is inapplicable when the
same cause of action is pending before ... courts of different states") (citations omitted).
307See, e.g., Acierno, 679 A.2d at 458 (finding that the trial court erred in giving
preference to the state action filed first and that the race to the courthouse should not be
determinative); DeAngelis v. Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., 641 A.2d 834, 838 (Del. Ch.
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discretionary, however, and in addition to considering the dates of filing,
courts consider other factors, such as whether the parties, claims or issues, and
remedies are identical, 308 the relative congestion of the courts' dockets, 30 9 the
relative ease of access to proof; the availability of compulsory processes for
witnesses, the possibility of a view of the premises, if appropriate; the
governing law, 310 and the presence of "special equities."'31 Given the breadth
of the courts' discretion and the malleability of these factors, the first-in-time
rule is not firm and does not solve the dueling class action problem.
Moreover, in federal/state cases, the Supreme Court has stated that federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction
given them. '312 Only "exceptional" 31 3 circumstances and the "clearest of

1993) (noting that Delaware courts "will stay after-filed suits when previously-filed suits
stating similar claims are pending in another court .... particularly ... when the primary
claims ... are based on federal laws and a federal suit is already pending") (citation
omitted), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Prezant v. DeAngelis, 636 A.2d 915 (Del. 1994);
Florida Crushed Stone Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 632 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that "it is... an abuse of discretion to refuse to stay a subsequently filed state
court action in favor of a previously filed federal action which involves the same parties and
the same or substantially similar issues"); City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Fraternal
Order of Police, 619 So. 2d 447, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "when a
previously filed federal action is pending between the same parties or privies on the same
issues, a subsequently filed state court action ordinarily should be stayed"); Howerton v.
Grace Hosp., 476 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
308See Florida Crushed Stone Co., 632 So. 2d at 220 (stating that state court must stay a
subsequently filed state court action in favor of previously filed federal action involving
same parties and same issues); American Home Prods. Corp., 668 A.2d at 73-74 (stating
that if these three requirements are met, then the defendant is entitled to a stay, barring the
finding of special equities); Howerton, 476 S.E.2d at 443; Project Eng'g, 833 S.W.2d at 724
(upholding denial of stay because there was not a complete identity of parties or issues).
309 See City of Miami Beach, 619 So. 2d at 448 (observing that the trial court may deny a
stay "where the need for state-federal comity is outweighed by ... the congestion of the
federal docket").
3 0 See Acierno, 679 A.2d at 458 (citation omitted) (finding that the state court could
provide adequate and timely relief by deciding state law issues).
311 American Home Prods. Corp., 668 A.2d at 74 (maintaining that a defendant may be
entitled to a stay once he has met prerequisites unless the plaintiff demonstrates special
equities); see also William Gluckin & Co., 407 F.2d at 178 (noting that barring special
circumstances, priority should be given to the court in which the action was first filed);
Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, 435 S.E.2d 571, 573 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the special circumstances of the convenience for witnesses and
availability of compulsory process favored retention of jurisdiction); see also Miller, supra
note 2, at 521-22 (noting that decisions to abstain in state/state cases reflect considerations
of comity, efficiency and a variety of discretionary matters).
312 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)
(citations omitted); see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 15 (1982).
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justifications ' 314 will warrant a dismissal or a stay "due to the presence of a
'3 5
concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration. 1
Hence, in federal/state cases, federal courts ordinarily will not defer to dueling
class actions pending in state court, especially if the federal suit raises claims
within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction.
D. Auctions

In his article, Overlapping Class Actions, Professor Geoffrey Miller invites
316
courts to experiment with litigation auctions to control dueling class actions.
Miller and Professor Jonathan Macey advocate such auctions as a means to
reduce the agency costs that inhere in "large-scale, small-claim" class action
suits and shareholders' derivative suits:

317

Upon the filing of a class action complaint, the judge would conduct an
initial investigation to determine whether the case would be appropriate
for auction. If the judge decided to go forward, he or she would conduct
an auction of the claim. Anyone, including the defendant, could bid for
the litigation; if the defendant made the high bid, the case would settle.

313 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at
19, 25.
3' Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819; see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at

16, 25 (citation omitted) (explaining that the court's other task is to find "clearest of
justifications" under which it may surrender jurisdiction).
315 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 15
(citation omitted). In determining whether a dismissal or stay in these circumstances is
appropriate, the federal court should consider the inconvenience of the federal forum, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by
the courts, especially if the courts have asserted jurisdiction over property, the progress that
has been made in the two actions, the source of governing law, and the inadequacy of the
state court proceeding to protect the federal litigant's rights. See Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 818; Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 19-27; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1367-68, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990) (also considering the prevention of
forum-shopping and the "substantial similarity" of the two actions).
316See Miller, supra note 2, at 543-46.
317See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 105-116;
Macey & Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform, supra note 52, at 914 (noting that the
auction approach is the optimal method to reduce agency costs); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 458, 460-62 (1993) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action Suits]
(advocating judicial experimentation with auctions in large-scale, small claim cases). Other
scholars also have considered the auction approach in connection with class actions. See,
e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 51, at 691-93 (discussing the
auction approach but ultimately concluding that such an approach is "unpromising"); Leo
Herzel & Robert K. Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, 7
LITIG. 25, 27, 60 (Winter 1981) (supporting the idea of an auction approach for class action
suits).
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The judge would award the claim to the highest bidder, deduct expenses,
and distribute the remaining funds to the class members upon filing of
proper proofs of claim. Meanwhile, the winning bidder would prosecute
the case (unless the defendant submits the high bid) much like a standard
class action.3" 8
Professors Macey and Miller posit that by reducing agency and transaction
costs and ensuring vigorous prosecution of the claim by its owner, the auction
approach would increase the size of settlements. Anticipating these enhanced
settlement values, bidders would increase their bids, which would redound to
the benefit of the class members. The auction would tend to direct the claim to
the most efficient user, who again would share some of the anticipated gains
with the class members in the form of a higher bid. Private enforcement of the
law would also improve, as defendants would realize that they could not buy a
cheap settlement with a generous fee. Defendants could also be expected to
comply with the law more readily ex ante to avoid the prospect of vigorously
3 9
prosecuted private litigation. 1
320
Although courts have experimented with variants of the auction model,
318

Miller, supra note 2, at 544 (footnotes omitted); see also Macey & Miller, The

Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 106-08. Other scholars advocate a variation of
this approach where the defendant would be prohibited from bidding at the auction. See,
e.g., Thomas & Hansen, supra note 51, at 448-49 (theorizing that the defendant's
participation in the auction approach would incline rational nondefendant bidders to bid
lower than they would otherwise).
"' See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 108-10
(discussing the advantages of the auction approach); see also Macey & Miller, A Market
Approach to Tort Reform, supra note 52, at 913-14; Rubin, supra note 53, at 1448-50
(discussing the benefits that the auction approach can bring to class action litigation).
320 See, e.g., Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co., No. 97 C 624, 1997 WL 529553, at *3 (N.D.
I11.Aug. 15, 1997) (holding that counsel fees would be taken into consideration in proposals
to represent the class); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1201
(N.D. I11.1996) (auctioning off only the fight to litigate the claim, not the claim itself, to the
attorney willing to take the case for the smallest percentage of the recovery); In re Wells
Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223, 225 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that class counsel for
securities claim would be selected by competitive bidding and that the two firms who were
previously acting as de facto class counsel could not submit a joint bid); In re Oracle Sec.
Litig.,131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that the selection of class counsel in
securities action would be determined by competitive bidding); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132
F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (accepting a bid from a law firm to act as class counsel
despite the firm being the only entity to submit a valid bid). The alternative proposed in In
re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig. has been criticized by a number of scholars. See
Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 113 (noting that "this
approach would reintroduce a substantial element of agency costs, in that the winning
attorney would have an incentive to settle early in order to obtain a larger profit on the fee")
(footnote omitted); Rubin, supra note 51, at 1454-55 (acknowledging the same deficiency in
this approach); see also Macey & Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform, supra note
317, at 914; Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action Suits, supra note 52, at 461. Yet
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even Professors Macey and Miller acknowledge that the auction approach is no
"panacea for the problems attending large-scale, small-claim litigation. '32 1 In
fact, they identify a panoply of problems with the auction approach (many of
which, they believe, can be overcome). 322 The authors acknowledge that "the
mass-tort setting poses problems for the auction approach not found in the
securities-law context, including issues of proof and conflict of laws as well as
federal-state jurisdictional problems. '323 Of greatest relevance here is their
concession that
The auction approach would ...face inevitable problems of multidistrict
litigation. If suit is filed in one federal district court, the trial court would
not have the power to conduct a nationwide auction that would preclude
the prosecution by plaintiffs' attorneys of the same claim in other
districts ....
But even if... [transfer and consolidation] procedures
effectively consolidate litigation as between federal district courts, it is
unclear how the auction procedure would deal with cases in which
class.., claims are filed simultaneously in state as well as federal
courts.324

In other words, the auction approach would not work in the dueling class

action context.
This conclusion appears justified. While the court investigates the
appropriateness of the auction procedure and arranges to conduct an auction,
the pressure to settle on lawyers representing the class in other actions would
remain or even increase. Assuming an auction was held, even the sale of the
claim would not itself forestall other dueling class actions. Unless the court
viewed the auction proceeds as a res, a federal court would have no authority

another variation would be for the court to auction off the right to represent the class for a
fixed percentage of the recovery. See id. at 461-62 (discussing this variant and its
advantages);- Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 113-14
(discussing this variant's advantages and disadvantages).
321 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 110.
322 See id. at 110-16 (discussing the various problems that inhere in the auction
approach). Other scholars have also recognized these problems. See Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiff'sAttorney, supra note 51, 691-93 (concluding that the "auction approach seems
unpromising" in part because it would eliminate the incentive for attorneys to detect and
investigate legal violations in the first instance); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra
note 51, at 77-79 (discussing additional problems that inhere in the auction process); Rubin,
supra note 53, at 1450-55 (discussing problems and limitations associated with auction
approach); Thomas & Hansen, supra note 51, at 436, 446-53 (agreeing that the problems
Macey and Miller identify can be overcome, but finding the costs of an auction system to be
much greater than Macey and Miller recognize).
323 Miller, supra note 2, at 545; see also Macey & Miller, A Market Approach to Tort
Reform, supra note 52, at 915-17.
324 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 51, at 115 (footnote
omitted).
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under the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception 325 to enjoin dueling class actions
pending in state courts. Likewise, it is unlikely that the relitigation
exception 326 would be available as the court would not have entered a final
judgment entitled to preclusive effect or full faith and credit until after
litigation or settlement of the underlying claim by its owner. Thus, while the
auction procedure may hold promise in reducing agency costs in single class
action suit, it does not appear to hold the answer to the dueling class actions
problem.
Taken together, then, the tools currently available to judges are inadequate
to redress the problems posed by dueling class actions. Having identified the
limits of these existing tools, one may now begin to consider the legislative
changes necessary to curb the problems.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

A number of relatively modest changes in the law would ameliorate many of
the problems posed by dueling class actions without effecting a dramatic
change in the relationship between state and federal courts or their respective
workloads. These "quick fixes," however, would not eliminate all of the
problems. If all simultaneous dueling class actions could be consolidated into a
single action, virtually all of the problems described in Part II could be
avoided, but such a dramatic legislative solution would create a host of
problems of its own. Let us begin by considering some relatively modest
recommendations.
A. The "Quick Fixes"

1. Registry for All Class Actions
Many of the problems caused by dueling class actions could be eliminated
or relieved if the courts entertaining the class actions were aware that dueling
class actions were pending and if the courts communicated with other courts
entertaining such suits. Such awareness and communication could be fostered
by the development and maintenance of a central registry for all class actions.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") provides a helpful
327
analogue.
The UCCJA, and the more recently approved Uniform Child Custody

325 28

U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
id.
327 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 16 , 9-1A U.L.A. 625-26 (1968)
[hereinafter UCCJA]. Other statutes creating registries include the UNIF. RECIPROCAL
326 See

ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT OF 1968 § 307 (amended 1968), 9B U.L.A. 541 (1987 &

1999 Supp.) (requiring the clerk to maintain a registry for "foreign support proceedings"),
and the federal Copyright Act § 408, 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1994) (providing a registry system
for copyright holders to register their works).
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Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), 328 were designed to avoid

jurisdictional competition and to foster cooperation among the courts of the
several states concerning child custody. 329 To this end, the UCCJA requires
the clerks of the state courts to maintain a registry of certified copies of
custody decrees of other states, as well as communications regarding the
pendency of custody proceedings in other states. 330 The UCCJEA further
requires the parties to custody litigation to provide to the court, in the form of a
pleading or affidavit, information regarding other proceedings concerning the
child "that could affect the current proceeding .... ,,331 Numerous provisions
in the two statutes authorize courts entertaining custody proceedings to
communicate with courts in other states, to assist such courts in obtaining
evidence and to seek the assistance of courts in other states. 332 The goal of all
of these provisions (as well as the jurisdictional provisions in the statutes) is to
ensure that the courts of only one state have responsibility for the custody of
any child.

333

In the child custody context, where a small number of contestants seek
custody of any given child, the creation of fifty state registries coupled with
affirmative disclosure obligations, ensures that all courts will learn of other
actions involving the same child. In class actions, on the other hand, class
members are very numerous. More than one class action could be filed on
behalf of the same class without the named representatives or their lawyers
being aware of the other suits. Thus, multiple registries in the several states,
coupled with a federal registry, likely would not ensure notice to the courts.
Instead, Congress should enact a statute to establish a single registry to be
334
maintained by the Clerk of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
328 The UCCJEA, which revises the law on child custody jurisdiction, was adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997. See generally
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9-1A U.L.A. 257 (Supp.
1999) [hereinafter UCCJEA].

329 See UCCJA § 1, 9-1A U.L.A. at 271; UCCJEA § 101 commentary, 9-1A U.L.A. at

261-62.
130 See UCCJA § 16, 9-1A U.L.A. at 625-26.
' UCCJEA § 209(a)(2), 9-1A U.L.A. at 281-82. The UCCJA imposes similar duties.
See UCCJA § 9(c), 9-1A U.L.A. at 544-45 (requiring the parties to inform the court of any

custody proceedings concerning the child in any other state).
332 See UCCJA §§ 18-20, 9-A U.L.A. at 318-22; UCCJEA, §§ 110-12, 9-A U.L.A. at
248-50.
...See Petition of Edilson, 637 P.2d 362, 365 n.3 (Colo. 1981) (stating that the basic
policy of the UCCJA is that only one state should have responsibility for the custody of a
child); Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. App. 1980); see also UCCJEA
prefatory note, 9-1A U.L.A. at 238-39.
331 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994) (establishing the "judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation" and authorizing this panel to transfer civil actions that involve common questions
of fact to a common district for consolidation of pretrial proceedings). Rule 1 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Panel defines the "Clerk of the Panel" as "the official appointed by the
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Congress should require that all counsel commencing plaintiff class actions in
any court within the United States provide to the Clerk of the Panel:
(a) a copy of any complaint containing class action allegations, with the
paragraphs defining the class highlighted or otherwise noted;
(b) the names, addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers and e-mail
addresses (if available) of:
(i)

the representative parties commencing the action;

(ii)

all counsel purporting to represent the class;

(iii) all parties named as defendants; and
(iv) all counsel representing such defendants (as soon as known);
and
(c) a sworn statement averring that counsel has consulted the registry to
determine if another class action on behalf of the same (or an
overlapping) class, or against the same defendant, has been commenced,
and that:
(i)

no other such class action has been commenced, or

(ii) if another such class action has been commenced, that the
complaint in the class action to be registered:
a. alleges the status of all such other class actions (whether
pending, dismissed, resolved, or otherwise); and
b. verifies that the benefits to the class to be gained by
prosecution of the action being registered outweigh the
problems likely to arise as a result of the pendency of dueling
class actions, 335 with such paragraphs highlighted or otherwise
noted.
In making this verification, class counsel should consider (a) the extent to
which the classes in the dueling actions overlap, (b) the similarity of the claims
raised and the relief sought, (c) whether the court entertaining the other class
action would have subject matter jurisdiction over all of the claims asserted,
(d) the potential for consolidation of the dueling class actions, (e) the
availability of an injunction to bar prosecution of the other dueling class action,
(f) the respective qualifications of the class representatives and their counsel in
Panel to Act as Clerk of the Panel and shall include those deputized by the Clerk of the
Panel to perform or assist in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of the Panel." R.
PRO. J.P.M.L. 1.

section of the registry proposal imposes a substantive verification
requirement, which is designed to dovetail with the change in the existing
certification standards of Rule 23 proposed in Part V.A.2.a.
335This

2000]

DUELING CLASS ACTIONS

the dueling class actions, and (g) the quality of the representation provided to
date by class counsel in the dueling class action. 336
The legislation should further require counsel to notify the clerk of any
significant changes in the status of a registered class action, including the filing
of a motion for class certification, the resolution of such a motion, preliminary
or final approval of a proposed settlement in the action, dismissal or entry of
summary or final judgment. It should also require counsel to consult the
registry immediatelj before moving for class certification and to file with the
court in which the motion is made a sworn statement averring that no other
class action on behalf of the same (or an overlapping) class, or against the
same defendant, has been commenced. If such other class action has been
commenced, counsel's sworn statement should explain why the benefits to the
class to be gained by prosecution of the action outweigh the problems expected
to arise as a result of the pendency of dueling class actions.
The legislation should also authorize courts entertaining class actions to
strike class action allegations, remove class counsel from an action or hold
class counsel in contempt if, after affording class counsel notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the court finds that class counsel has failed to comply
with these registry provisions. Finally, the legislation should direct the clerk of
the Panel to maintain the registry. The clerk should make available all
information regarding registered actions that counsel would need to comply
with the legislation and make available to courts any registered information or
pleadings requested. Any and all communications between courts facilitated
by the registry should be conducted on the record.
The registry would serve at least two purposes. First, it would inform
prospective class counsel of the existence of other actions already brought on
behalf of the same class. It would also require class counsel to notify the court
(in the class action complaint) of the dueling class actions and explain the need
for another class action on behalf of the same class. At the very least, this
legislation should lead some lawyers, who would have been unaware of
duplicative litigation, to decline to file a dueling class action, thereby
minimizing the likelihood of this phenomenon.
Second, the registry would ensure that courts receive notice regarding
dueling class actions in the complaint and upon filing of a motion for class
certification. Coupled with the next "quick fix" (which would bar certification
of dueling class actions unless the court concluded that the benefits would
outweigh the anticipated problems), 337 the registry should substantially reduce
the number of dueling class actions that are filed or certified. Even if the
number of dueling class actions remains unaffected, however, notice regarding
dueling class actions should enable courts to remedy or avoid many of the
problems that currently plague dueling class actions.
336

These are the same factors that courts deciding whether or not to certify a dueling

class action will apply under the proposal made in Part V.A.2.a.
311 See infra Part V.A.2.a.
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For instance, early notice might prompt a court to transfer a suit to the
district or county where the first suit is pending for consolidated
proceedings. 338 A court might also choose to stay the proceeding before it in
deference to the other suit, or, in certain cases (and if other modest legislative
changes are made), 339 to enjoin the dueling action. Even if the court took no
such action, awareness of the other suit should prompt it to scrutinize the
notice provided to the class more carefully to ensure that class members are not
confused by, and are fully informed of, the pendency of the dueling class
should help resolve a number of the problems posed
actions. Thus, the registry
340
by dueling class actions.
2. Amendment of Rule 23 and State Class Action Rules
a. Rules to Limit Certificationof Dueling Class Actions

Rule 23(a) 34 1 and the state rules of civil procedure should be amended to bar
the certification of a class action if a certified dueling class action is pending,
unless a court finds that the benefits to the class to be gained by prosecution of
the action outweigh the problems expected to arise from the pendency of
dueling class actions. In making this finding, the court should consider the
same factors that counsel would take into account in making the verification
342
required in Part V.A. 1.
If courts decline to certify dueling class actions because the benefits fail to
outweigh the potential problems, the number of dueling class actions would be
reduced and the resulting problems would be eliminated. This modification
would survive a constitutional challenge, as would-be representatives could
still put forth their individual claims even if class certification were denied,
and
343
the absent class members' potential claims would remain unaffected.
338

This option would exist if the dueling class action were pending within the same

judicial system.
339 For a list of these legislative changes, see infra Part V.A.3.
340 The registry proposal is not a panacea, however, for settlement class actions
generally. Defendants can still hold "reverse auctions" before a single class action
complaint is filed. The registry proposal could be modified to require prospective class
counsel to register pre-complaint negotiations with a defendant, but such a requirement
would be much harder to enforce and, by increasing the number of filings, could make
administration of the registry more burdensome.
341 FED. R. Civ. P. (23)(a) (providing "Prerequisites to a Class Action").
342 In addition the court should consider the availability of an injunction to bar
prosecution of the dueling class action.
343 Even if Rule 23 and the state certification rules are not amended as proposed, courts
presented with certification motions should scrutinize them carefully and decline to certify
dueling class actions where the benefits are not apparent. In other words, if the registry
proposal is adopted and courts learn about the pendency of dueling class actions, they may
be able to reduce the number of dueling class actions by declining to certify ones that do
would not add any benefit, whether or not the certification standards are amended formally.
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Enactment of this rule would likely prompt a race to the courthouse door (or
at least a race to class certification). Courts can ensure that the class is
represented by the most effective counsel (rather than the quickest) by
scrutinizing class certifications motions more carefully and rigorously applying
the certification requirements, especially the adequacy of representation
requirement. 344 The appointment of a class advocate, discussed below, will
further deter unscrupulous or incompetent lawyers from seeking to represent
the class.
b. Rules to Require Appointment of a Class Advocate

Rule 23 and the state certification rules should be further amended to require
class counsel and the defendant, upon the presentation of a settlement to the
court for approval, to post a bond to cover the costs of a court-appointed
advocate. This advocate will scrutinize the fairness and adequacy of the
proposed settlement and make a report to the court. This proposal, previously
advanced by Professor John Leubsdorf, 345 would counter the informational
deficiencies that result once class counsel and the defendant reach an
agreement and lose any incentive to identify for the court weaknesses in the
346
proposed settlement.
Requiring class counsel and the defendant to pay the fees of the advocate, in
and of itself, should deter the presentation of grossly unfair settlements.
Appointment of the advocate and provision to her of reasonable access to all
relevant information should ensure that the court is better informed before
ruling on the fairness of any proposed settlement. 347 Although perhaps
providing courts with the same kinds of information now furnished by
objectors and class counsel in dueling class actions, the court-appointed
advocate would be free from charges of self-interest, and her conclusions
would be free from suspicion.
344 See FED. R.Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that the representative parties of the class will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class).
345 In a statement to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at a public hearing on
proposed amendments to Rule 23, Professor Leubsdorf advocated an amendment to require
"courts to appoint a lawyer to challenge any proposed settlement in any class action in
which the estimated value of the relief (including attorney fees) exceeds $1,000,000." John
Leubsdorf, Statement at the Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 9 (Nov. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with the author) [hereinafter
Statement of John Leubsdorf]; see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 34 (Executive Summary) (Rand

Inst. 1999) (suggesting that judges should seek assistance from "knowledgeable but
disinterested parties," including neutral experts and accountants); Koniak & Cohen, supra
note 56, at 1109 n. 190 (supporting Leubsdorf's proposal).
346See Statement of John Leubsdorf, supra note 345, at 9 (arguing that named plaintiffs
and defendants unite in arguing the merits of a proposed settlement to the court).
141 See id. at 9 (noting that an appointed advocate should be instructed to bring to the
court's attention all reasonable arguments supporting rejection of the settlement offer).
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3. Amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act
If adopted, the certification standards described above should greatly reduce
the number of dueling class actions. If that proposal is not adopted, however,
or if it is less effective than contemplated in reducing the number of dueling
class actions, Congress should authorize federal courts to enjoin dueling class
actions pending in state court. Although not a panacea, the availability of an
injunction against pending parallel class actions would reduce the number of
dueling class actions and the attendant problems. Congress would need to craft
language to amend the Anti-Injunction Act,348 which has been read to narrowly
limit the authority of federal courts to enjoin parallel in personam actions
pending in state court. 349 Other suggestions have been made to expand the

authority of federal courts to enjoin concurrent state actions. 350 For present
purposes, however, the Act need only be amended to authorize federal courts
entertaining certified class actions to enjoin any other transactionally related
class action that would interfere with the effective and efficient disposition of
the federal class action. 351 Such language would not authorize injunctions
against individual actions by absent class members who opt out of the federal
class action, but would authorize the court to bar them from suing on behalf of
others.
In exercising this power, courts should use their discretion, taking into
account the factors described in Part V.A.2.a. The Court should also consider
how far the other class actions have progressed, 352 the interests of nonparties 35 3 and other relevant considerations. If the named representatives in the
dueling class action to be enjoined are non-parties to the federal action, the
court can enjoin them only if they are subject to the court's jurisdiction. To
maximize the utility of the anti-suit injunction, Congress should grant the
lower federal courts authority to enjoin the parties to dueling class actions

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
See supra Part IV.B.
350 See supranote 285 and sources cited therein.
311 This recommendation borrows the "transactionally related" language from the from
348

141

the ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT. See generally ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT,

supra note 264, § 5.04(a) (authorizing transferee court to enjoin "transactionally related
proceedings"). The remaining language comes from 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 274,
§ 4225, at 533 (using the language "efficient disposition of a federal class action"), and
Wood, supra note 281, at 320 (stating that an injunction may be appropriate when
"necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a class action").
352 See ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 5.04(b)( 1), at 263.

353 See Sherman, supra note 101, at 934-35 (identifying the "interests of nonparties" as a
factor for consideration when deciding whether to grant an antisuit injunction); see also ALI
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, §5.04(b)(4), at 263 (identifying "whether
parties to the action to be enjoined were permitted to exclude themselves from the
consolidated proceeding").
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wherever they may be found within the country. 354 This jurisdictional
provision could be modeled on the nationwide service and injunction provision

in the federal interpleader statute. 355 These amendments to the Anti-Injunction
Act coupled with the notice provided by the registry legislation, would give
federal courts greater authority to limit the number of simultaneous dueling
class actions and to deal more effectively with the class actions before them.
4. Amendment of Section 1407
Another "quick fix" would be to amend § 1407 to permit the transferee court
entertaining dueling class actions to retain for trial actions that are transferred
and consolidated for pretrial purposes. 356 Such legislation is necessary to
overcome the barrier to consolidated trials posed by the language of the current
statute and the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach.357 Discretion to retain transferred class actions for trial is
desirable for a variety of reasons. First, it fosters consistency by ensuring that
related cases are handled together. Second, it preserves judicial resources by
permitting consolidated trials. Third, it allows the cases to be tried before a
358
judge who is familiar with the facts, the attorneys and the procedural history.
The arguments against consolidated trials of individual claims are

354 Cf ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 5.04 cmt. b, n.7, at 268-69
(recognizing that authorizing a transferee court the power to issue a binding order on
persons not parties to the litigation would greatly expand jurisdictional power); id. § 3.08, at
147 (providing that a transferee court may exercise jurisdiction over any parties to the full
extent permitted by the Constitution) (citation omitted).
...See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994); see also ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note
264, § 5.04 cmt. b, n.7, at 269 (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 2361 grants similar nationwide
authority).
356 The House of Representatives attempted to implement this "quick fix" in September
of 1999 when it passed the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of
1999, H.R. 2112, 106th Cong., § 2 (1999) (allowing a transferee judge to retain jurisdiction
over certain multidistrict cases). In October of that year the Senate passed a substitute bill.
See Multidistrict Jurisdiction Act of 1999, S. 1748, 106th Cong., (1999); the House rejected
the amendment and agreed to a conference. 145 CONG. REC. H12,020 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
1999). The idea of amending section 1407 is widely supported by a number of scholars.
See, e.g., ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 3.02, at 62-70 (proposing a
Complex Litigation Panel and authorizing transferee court to retain transferred cases for
trial); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 345, at 29 (suggesting that "Congress could amend the
statute ... to give the panel authority to assign multiple competing federal class actions to a
single federal judge for all purposes, including trial") (footnote omitted); Conway, supra
note 2, at 1107-08, 1108 n.45 (advocating amendment of § 1407 to provide for consolidated
adjudication of multistate cases in state courts).
35' 523 U.S. 26, 39-40 (holding that a transferee court may not invoke section 1404(a) to
assign a transferred case to itself for trial).
35 See Conway, supra note 2, at 1103.
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unconvincing in this context. 359
While an amendment of § 1407 to permit retention for trial of consolidated
cases would help ameliorate some of the problems posed by dueling class
actions in the federal/federal cases, it is a solution of quite limited utility since
it does nothing to address the problems that arise in state/state and state/federal
cases.

360

5. Better Notice to Absent Class Members and Class Counsel in Dueling
Class Actions
Congress should enact legislation to address specifically some of the
informational deficiencies previously described in Part II.B.2. and Part II.B.3.
In particular, Congress could direct courts entertaining plaintiff class actions to
require that notice to the class be written in plain, easily understood language
and that it include (among other things) the status of dueling class actions and
complete information regarding attorneys' fees. 361 If the dueling class actions
have been dismissed, the notice should explain why. If they are still pending,
the notice should set forth the effects that settlement or judgment in the class
action sub judice would have in the other actions. Whenever class members
have already received a notice regarding a dueling class action, the first page
of the new notice should disclose, in red ink and bold typeface, that the notice
should not be discarded because it provides information regarding a different
suit. If the notice informs class members of a proposed settlement agreement,
it should identify not only the benefits that will accrue to the class as a result of
the settlement, but also the rights that class members will waive or lose in
362
accepting the settlement.
In addition, before sending any type of notice to the class, class counsel
should be required to consult the registry described in Part V.A. 1 to determine
whether any dueling class actions exist. If dueling class actions exist, counsel
should be required to send a copy of the notice to class counsel and the named
representatives in the dueling class actions. Given such notice, the recipients
"I See Roger

H. Transgrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.

REv. 779, 806-07 (1984) (outlining reasons for limiting transferee court's duties to pretrial
proceedings).
360 If Congress does not amend § 1407 as recommended, transferee courts entertaining
dueling class actions could choose to decertify all but one of them (since certification orders
are conditional under Rule 23(c)(1)).
361The proposed Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999),
would add a new § 1713 to Title 28 of the United States Code, which would require the
inclusion of specific types of information in any written notice ("either through the mail or
publication in printed media") provided to the class (such as "the legal consequences of
being a member of the class action," the benefits and drawbacks of accepting a proposed
settlement agreement, "the dollar amount of any attorney's fee class counsel will be
seeking," and "an explanation of how any attorney's fee will be calculated and funded"); see
also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 345, at 35 (recommending "plain-English notices").
362See S. 353.
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should be motivated to identify weaknesses, if any, in a proposed settlement
and to object, thereby bringing such weaknesses to the court's attention.
Although the court might have reason to question the objectors' intentions in
this situation, 363 it nevertheless would receive more information regarding the
adequacy of the proposed settlement than it otherwise would (unless the courtappointed advocate proposal is adopted).
Taken together, these "quick fixes" should provide courts and class
members with more complete information regarding dueling class actions, and
should give courts more control over the actions before them. These steps
should also reduce the number of dueling class actions, both because lawyers
who consult the registry may decline to file, and because courts should refuse
to certify any dueling class actions that would not substantially benefit the
class. Even if the number of dueling class actions remains unchanged,
however, fully informed courts, equipped with greater authority under the
Anti-Injunction Act, would be able to stay litigation before them, enjoin
litigation pending elsewhere or transfer for trial dueling class actions
consolidated for pretrial purposes. Finally, the appointment of a class advocate
should help overcome many of the informational deficiencies that currently
exist and facilitate better-informed judicial scrutiny of class action settlements.
B. More DramaticPossibilities

An alternative solution for eliminating all (or virtually all) of the problems
that arise in state/state and federal/state dueling class actions (identified in Part
II) would be to enact legislation that permits the consolidation of all
transactionally related class actions before a single court. 364
Such
consolidation would conserve judicial and other resources, alleviate the
pressure that existing dueling class actions place on class counsel, remedy
many of the informational deficiencies 365 and avoid a myriad of preclusion
problems. But proposals to effect such consolidation, especially in the
federal/state cases, are controversial and hence would be difficult to
implement. Let us begin with the somewhat less formidable state/state cases.
363

See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.

364 See Conway, supra note 2, at 1101 ("The problems resulting from competing class

actions may best be solved by consolidation of the actions in one court."); see also ALl
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, chs. 3-5, at 21-303 (examining and

discussing federal intrasystem consolidation, consolidation of complex litigation in state
courts, and federal-state intersystem consolidation); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

§ 30.3, at 235 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that "[c]onsolidation for trial of class and individual
actions may be useful").
365 If class counsel and the defendant in the consolidated class action reached a
settlement early on in the litigation, some of the informational deficiencies described in Part
II.B would still exist. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. ("The risk [that class
counsel would withhold relevant information from the class] would not be eliminated[,] as
the class counsel's incentive in gaining judicial approval of the settlement would be greater
than her interest in affording the class complete information.").
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1. Consolidation of State/State Dueling Class Actions
Currently, no vehicle exists for transferring a case from the court of one
state to the court of another state, making consolidation of state/state dueling
class actions pending in different states impossible. Two legislative solutions
are possible, however: (1) enactment by the states of uniform legislation
authorizing interstate transfers and consolidation or (2) adoption of an
366
interstate compact that authorizes interstate transfers and consolidation.
Regardless of the vehicle chosen, the entity charged with the interstate transfer
decision should proceed cautiously, so as to preserve interstate federalism and
protect litigants' due process rights 367 and expectations regarding where their
368
suits will be heard.
Both the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Reporter

to the ALI Complex Litigation Project have proposed model legislation that
permits interstate transfers and consolidation.

Although neither model was

specifically designed to address dueling class actions, both are sufficiently
broad enough to permit the transfer and consolidation of state/state dueling
class actions.
The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, approved by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1991, would authorize state courts
to transfer an action or part of an action to a court of another jurisdiction as
long as the transferee court consented. 369 Under the Act, a state court could
transfer an action "to serve the fair, efficient, and effective administration of
justice and the convenience of the parties and witnesses. ' 370 This broad
366 See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.02, at 201
(recommending "formulation of an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform
Complex Litigation Act").
367 Due process problems would arise if an action were transferred to a state court that
lacked personal jurisdiction over some or all of the parties. See generally ALl COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, at app.B, § 8, at 455 (REPORTER'S STUDY: A MODEL
SYSTEM FOR STATE-TO-STATE TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION) [hereinafter REPORTER'S
STUDY] (recommending that the transferee court "exercise jurisdiction over any parties to
the consolidated action ...to full extent of the power permitted by the United States
Constitution"). These problems are least severe in plaintiff class actions because "[t]he
burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are not of the same order or
magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985).
368 REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 366, § 8 cmt. e, at 541-43 (discussing that "fairness
[to the individual litigant] is an essential element of any due process analysis," and that "the
potential unfairness that may result by placing some cases in a distant state court" could be
addressed by the application of a "Fifth Amendment jurisdiction standard to state-to-state
transfer").
369 UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT §§ 101-103, 204, 14 U.L.A. 191-94, 201 (Supp. 1999)
("A... court... may transfer all or part of the action to a court... which consents to the

transfer and can exercise jurisdiction over the matters transferred.").
370 Id. § 104, 14 U.L.A. at 194.
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language would permit a state court to transfer a dueling class action to another
state in which a transactionally related class action was pending. If the
legislation were enacted in all fifty states, this uniform law would permit the
transfer and consolidation of simultaneous state/state class actions that would
greatly minimize the problems described in Part II above. Given that no state
has yet adopted the Act, 371 it will need a substantial "push" if it is to be
enacted.
The Reporter's Study to the ALl Complex Litigation Project advocates a
markedly different approach to uniform transfer legislation. 372 It contemplates
creation by the states of an Interstate Complex Litigation Panel ("ICL Panel"),
composed of judges from participating states, who would determine whether to
transfer and consolidate actions pending in multiple states. 373 The ICL Panel
would have authority to order transfer and consolidation if the "common
questions of fact predominate, and.., transfer and consolidation w[ould]
promote substantially the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions and is
superior to their separate adjudication." 374 Like the standard in the Uniform
Act, this standard is sufficiently elastic to permit transfer and consolidation of
most dueling class actions.
The Reporter's proposed ICL Panel offers a number of advantages over the
consensual model proposed in the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act. For
example, the ICL Panel would be able to act more expeditiously than
individual judges in the transferor and transferee courts acting
independently. 375 Unlike the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, which would
require consent of both state courts before the transfer could be made, the
Reporter's model would permit the ICL Panel to transfer actions without
seeking such consent. Once a state adopted the uniform legislation creating the
ICL Panel, it would be bound by the decisions made by the ICL Panel, whether
376
or not one of its judges served on the subpanel that ordered the transfer.
Such a mandatory system would ensure that litigation was consolidated
371 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
372 REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 366, intro, note, cmt. b, at 457-59.

373 The proposal contemplates a Panel, consisting of one judge from each state that
enacts the uniform legislation. The Panel members would appoint a Chief Judge, who
would appoint subpanels of three members. Id. § 2, at 473-74.
374 Id. § 1, at 459. A suggestion to transfer could be brought to the Panel: "(1) on
motion of any party to any potentially affected action; (2) at the suggestion of the state
court in which any such action is assigned; or (3) on the Panel's own initiative." Id. § 5, at
496.
375 See id. intro, note, cmts. a & b, at 455-59; id. § 2, cmt. a, at 474-75; id. § 2, cmt. b, at
476-79.
376 Id. intro, note, cmt. b, at 457-59 ("Consent would be given at the time of adopt[ion]
... and would not be required again at the time of consolidation ....
would be represented on the Panel, but the various subpanels

All member states
making individual

consolidation decisions would not necessarily include a representative from each of the
involved states.").
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whenever efficiency would be achieved, notwithstanding "the pressures to
favor local litigants and lawyers, or to avoid the burden of massive
consolidated proceedings. '377 Furthermore, the ICL Panel would be able to
decide, in one sitting, whether or not to transfer numerous cases pending in
different states to a single transferee court, whereas under the Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, each transferor court would independently have to
decide whether or not to order the transfer. Finally, the ICL Panel would
develop expertise over time, which would inform its transfer and consolidation
378
decisions.
Of course, states might prefer to retain greater control over the transfer
decisions to be made in individual cases. If so, they would be better off
enacting the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, which would enable them to
379
decide whether to transfer or accept transfers on a case-by-case basis.
As an alternative to uniform legislation altogether, the states could adopt an
interstate compact codifying either of the two interstate transfer vehicles
Adoption of a compact would have two obvious
described above. 380
advantages over uniform legislation. First, it would eliminate the problems
that arise when states enacting uniform laws employ language that differs from
that proposed by the Commissioners, When states join a compact, they adhere
to a single agreement, thereby eliminating inconsistencies in language or
policy. 38 1 Second, while a uniform act can be rescinded by any state at will, a
compact is binding unless formally renounced under its terms. 382 Thus, greater
uniformity and commitment would be achieved through a compact.
Disadvantages exist as well. Most obvious, adoption of an interstate
compact is a cumbersome process, requiring enactment by every state of
377 Id.

id.
37'A hybrid of the two proposed uniform laws would require consent of the Panel, the
378 See

transferor court and the transferee court. Such an approach, while preserving state
autonomy, would be less efficient and less likely to result in transfers than either of the two
proposed schemes. See id. intro, note, cmt. b, n.2, at 459.
380 See ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.02, at 201.

For a

discussion of the enactment process for an interstate compact, see Kevin J. Heron, The
Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally

Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 9-17 (1985) ("While the procedures for
creating interstate compacts may vary ... all interstate compact scenarios include
negotiation, preparation of the compact document, and ratification by potential party
states.").
381 See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.02 cmt. b, at 203-07

(noting that such problems are avoided and greater uniformity is assured when states join a
compact, because "the compact is created through the enactment of identical, or nearly
identical, legislation by participating states"); cf Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and
Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 59-62 (1997) (describing
problems that arise when states enact slightly different versions of the same uniform law).
382See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.02 cmt. b, at 203-07.
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identical legislation and approval by the Congress (in some cases) and the
President. 383 Furthermore, states may prefer the flexibility of uniform
384
legislation over a compact.
The differences between the consensual model and the ICL Panel model or
between uniform legislation and interstate compact are significant and deserve
attention, but are not so important that they should paralyze the states from
acting altogether. The problems that plague dueling state/state class actions
could be remedied by any of these models. Either a concerted effort should be
made to publicize the need for a general interstate transfer and consolidation
vehicle, or a scaled-down version should be proposed to permit interstate
transfer of dueling class actions only, rather than complex litigation generally.
Perhaps legislation with a narrower focus-with less risk of inundating
transferee courts with mountains of litigation-would more likely be adopted.
The proposals described above could be easily tailored to address dueling class
actions to the exclusion of other complex litigation.
2. Consolidation of Federal/State Dueling Class Actions
Crafting a transfer and consolidation vehicle for federal/state cases is even
more complicated because of daunting federalism concerns and complex
jurisdictional hurdles. A preliminary issue that must be resolved is whether to
seek consolidation in state or federal court. Both options will be explored.
a. Consolidationin State Court
Congress should adopt legislation (by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1407 or
otherwise) permitting the transfer of a class action pending in federal court to a
state court in which a transactionally related class action is pending. Such
legislation should vest the decision to transfer in the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. 385 Federal-to-state transfers should be limited to cases
in which: (1) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
dueling class actions occurred in a single state, 386 (2) at least one class action is
383See Heron, supra note 380, at 9-17 (outlining the enactment process for interstate
compacts). Congressional consent is required under the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State... unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay."), if the compact affects "the political power or influence" of particular
states or "encroach[es] ...upon the full and free exercise of federal authority." Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893); see also ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra
note 264, § 4.02 cmt. b & n.4, at 203-07 ("Congressional consent is required only if the
compact encroaches on federal supremacy.").
384 See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.02 cmt. b, at 203-07.
385 See id. §§ 3.02, 4.01, at 62, 177-78 (recommending that federal-to-state transfer

decisions be made by a Complex Litigation panel, which would replace the existing Panel);
Conway, supra note 3, at 1100 (suggesting that "Congress confer upon the Panel
discretionary authority to direct litigation to and from state courts").
386 Cf.28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1994) (permitting venue in "a judicial district in which a
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pending in the courts of that state, and (3) the law of that state likely would
govern. 387 To minimize federalism concerns and potential Tenth Amendment
problems, the legislation should require the Panel to obtain the consent of the
388
transferee court.

Assuming that consolidation of dueling federal/state class actions is
desirable, there are at least three reasons why these cases should be

consolidated in state court rather than federal court. First, from an institutional
competency perspective, since state law will likely apply, it is desirable to have
a state court sitting in that state interpret and apply its own law. 389 Second,
from a federalism perspective, it is respectful of state autonomy to have state
courts handle cases arising within their jurisdiction and governed by their law,
especially when at least one plaintiff purporting to sue on behalf of the class
has filed suit in that state's court. Finally, from a practical perspective, with
federal dockets as crowded as they are, 390 it makes sense to shift this subset of
dueling class actions to the state courts for consolidation. 391 The availability of
a state transferee court will be most helpful if some or all of the dueling class
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ....
").The ALl
Complex Litigation Project would permit transfers to a state court only if "the events giving
rise to the controversy are centered in a single state and a significant portion of the existing
litigation is lodged in the courts of that state .
ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT,
supra note 264, § 4.01 (a)(1), at 177.
387 Mr. Conway argues "that a necessary factor should be a likelihood that, after transfer,
the substantive law of the transferee court will govern much of the litigation." Conway,
supra note 2, at 1100; see also id. at 1111-12. Actions stating claims that arise under federal
law and, a fortiori, claims within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction, would not be
subject to transfer to state court. As an example of an appropriate case for transfer to state
court, consider the Hyatt Skywalk litigation, in which all plaintiffs were injured when two
skywalks collapsed in a Kansas City, Missouri hotel. The trial court that certified the class
action presumed that Missouri law would govern. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo. 1982), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175, 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988, 988 (1982); see also ALl COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.01 cmt. a, at 179.
388 The ALl Complex Litigation Project would require the Panel to obtain consent from
the "appropriate judicial authority in the state in which the designated transferee court is
located .... ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.01(a), at 178. For a
discussion of the Tenth Amendment concerns, see infra notes 398-400 and accompanying
text.
389 See Prepared Testimony of Brian Wolfman, Esq., offered in opposition to S. 353
(Fed. News Serv., May 4, 1999).
390 See, e.g., The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary,(Jan. 1, 1999) (William
H. Rehnquist, C.J.) (giving an account of the current increase in the Supreme Court
caseload).
391Of course, the state courts also are overburdened. Thus, before ordering the transfer,
the Panel should consider the state transferee court's caseload, its ability to handle the
consolidated class actions, and the efficiency gains to be achieved through consolidation,
see Conway, supra note 3, at 1110, and must obtain the consent of the transferee court.
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actions pending in state court are non-removable. 392 In such federal/state
dueling class actions, if consolidation is to occur at all, the federal cases must
be transferred to state court.
Although Congress could vest authority to make federal-to-state transfers in
the individual federal transferor courts, 393 it would be preferable to have the
Panel handle such decisions (for the same reasons that the Reporter advocated
an ICL Panel to make state/state transfer decisions). 394 First, unlike the Panel,
the transferor court might be subject to pressure from the parties or counsel

involved or from docket pressure, to make transfer decisions that might not be
optimal from a more global perspective. Second, with time, the Panel would
develop experience and expertise in determining which dueling federal/state
class actions would be handled most effectively in state court, and which state
courts scrutinize class actions settlements most carefully. Third, the Panel
could consider in a single-sitting motions to transfer numerous dueling federal
class actions arising from the same transaction, thereby ensuring that all the
actions were treated alike. On the other hand, if the transfer and consolidation
decisions were vested in the individual transferor courts, one federal class
action might be transferred for consolidation and another might not, thereby
frustrating efforts to consolidate all of the dueling class actions arising out of
the same transaction and inviting the problems described in Part II.
Both the Constitution and the federal diversity statute permit actions
between citizens of different states to be filed in federal court, 395 but the
Constitution does not mandate the availability of diversity jurisdiction. Thus,
because Congress could abolish the lower federal courts or eliminate diversity
jurisdiction altogether, 396 it may enact legislation authorizing the transfer to

392

Since these non-removable class actions could not be consolidated with other dueling

class actions in federal court, the only option for consolidation of all federal/state class
actions would be in state court.
393 Individual federal district courts handle transfer decisions under the existing transfer
statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406 (1994).
114 See supra notes 373-78 and accompanying text (maintaining that an ICL panel would
be able to act more expeditiously and efficiently).
395 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
between Citizens of different States .... "); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994) ("The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions ... between citizens of different States
.... ").
396 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,449 (1850) ("[H]aving a right to prescribe,
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies."); ALl COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.01 cmt. c, at 183;
John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts and the
Text of Article 111, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 209 (1997) (stating that under "the traditional
understanding... Congress may give [the inferior federal courts] all the jurisdiction the
Constitution permits, or none at all, or anything in between, as far as Article III [(of the U.S.
Constitution)] is concerned"). For a thorough discussion of the fascinating question of the
limits on Congressional control of federal jurisdiction, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
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state court of class actions filed in federal court on the basis of diversity. 397
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 398 is not an impediment, either.
Since the legislation would require the Panel to obtain the state transferee
court's consent, it would not compel the states "to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory prograr. '399 Even if such consent were not required, however, the
proposal would withstand scrutiny because it does nothing more than require
state courts to entertain actions arising under state law; it does not require state
400
executive officers to administer federal law.
b. Consolidationin FederalCourt
Since the federal-to-state transfer vehicle described above would permit
transfer to state court of only a subset of all dueling federal/state class actions,
another vehicle is necessary to permit consolidation of the remaining actions.
The federal/state dueling class actions that are not subject to transfer and
consolidation in state court under the proposal described in Part V.B.2.a.
should be consolidated before a single federal district court. To accomplish
this, Congress should amend the removal and multidistrict transfer statutes to
permit consolidation of dueling federal/state class actions in federal court. 40 1
JURISDICTION,

ch. 3 (3d ed. 1999).

397See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.01 cmt. c n.4, at 184.

398 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
399New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); see also FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1947). For a
discussion of the potential Tenth Amendment concerns that a federal-to-state transfer
mechanism raises, see ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 4.01, cmt. c,
n.6, at 184-85 and Conway, supra note 2, at 1117-21.
410 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-35 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 17879 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not
give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate."); FERC, 456 U.S. at 759-71 &
n.24 (examining "the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from generally
applicable federal regulations," and finding that a federal public utilities pricing act did "not
involve the compelled exercise of [the State's] sovereign powers"); Testa, 330 U.S. at 38994 (1947); cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
40' Numerous proposals have been made to permit the consolidation of complex cases or
class actions in federal court. See, e.g., Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999) (proposing the addition of §
1369 to Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, to grant diversity jurisdiction over
actions arising from a single incident that involve minimal diversity between adverse parties
and damages in excess of $75,000 per class member); ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT,

supra note 264, §§ 5.01, 5.03, at 220-22, 256-57 (authorizing removal by the Complex
Litigation Panel of actions pending in state court if they arise from the same transaction or
occurrence as an action pending in federal court and share a common question of fact with
that action, and extending supplemental jurisdiction over claims that arise from the same
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The Panel should be vested with authority to remove to federal court class
actions pending in state court if: (1) an action filed on behalf of a class in state
court is transactionally related to an action filed on behalf of a class pending in
federal court, and (2)(a) minimal diversity exists between the defendant and at
least one class member and the amount in controversy (gauged on the basis of
the defendant's liability to the class) exceeds the sum or value of $500,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, or (2)(b) the state class action complaint
contains a claim arising under federal law. 40 2 The Panel should not remove
state class actions under this provision if consolidation of dueling federal/state
class actions in state court is possible under the vehicle proposed in Part
V.B.2.a. Constitutional concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction would
be avoided by requiring that state class actions, to be removable, either contain
a claim arising under federal law or involve minimal diversity. 40 3 Due process
concerns would be avoided by providing an opportunity for class members to
4°4
opt out.
Any party to the class action (including absent class members) or the state
court on its own motion could recommend an action to the Panel for removal,
or the Panel could act on its own motion. While the general removal statute
vests the removal decision in the defendant (at least in the first instance), 40 5 the
transaction or occurrence as a claim removed pursuant to section 5.01). Other legislation
has been proposed to expand federal jurisdiction over class actions. See, e.g., Interstate
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1999) (proposing the
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to grant diversity jurisdiction over class actions where
minimal diversity exists and the addition of § 1453 to Chapter 89 of title 28, United States
Code, to permit removal of a class action by one class member without the consent of all
class members or by one defendant without the consent of all defendants), which was passed
by the House of Representatives on September 23, 1999, and the Class Action Fairness Act
of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1999) (proposing changes similar to H.R. 1875). For a
critique of these proposals, see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 345, at 28-30.
402 This provision is substantially more expansive than the standard removal provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994), which, when coupled with the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1994), and the Supreme Court's decision in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291,
291 (1973), permits removal of class actions filed on the basis of diversity only if complete
diversity exists between the named representatives and the defendants and if each class
member individually satisfies the $75,000 jurisdictional amount requirement.
403 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the federal interpleader statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994), which grants the federal district courts original jurisdiction of civil
actions of interpleader if the property has a value of at least $500 and two or more adverse
claimants to the property are of diverse citizenship, regardless of whether some claimants
are co-citizens. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31
(1967) (approving the "minimal diversity" requirement for interpleader). Cf Richard A.
Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI
Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 33-49 (1990) (examining and critiquing the constitutionality of
the jurisdictional provisions of an earlier draft of the ALl Complex Litigation Project).
404 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1980).
405 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
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proposed statute would vest the removal decision in the Panel. 40 6 Thus,
removal of a state dueling class action under this new provision would not be
of right, but rather in the Panel's discretion. In exercising that discretion, the
Panel should consider, among other factors, the interests of the class members
in keeping the litigation in state court, the relative convenience to the parties
and witnesses of the state court and the prospective federal transferee
district. 40 7 To avoid unnecessary disruption of state court litigation, the state
action would be stayed only if the Panel ordered the removal.
The Panel should order removal only if it intends to transfer the state class
action to the federal judicial district in which the dueling federal class action is
pending for consolidation. Section 1407 should be amended to authorize the
transfer and consolidation of class actions removed under this provision with
the dueling class action pending in the federal transferee district. If the claims
asserted in dueling class actions are governed by the laws of different states,
the Panel should instruct the transferee court to consider the appropriateness of
40 8
subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4).
Taken together, the interjurisdictional transfer mechanisms described in Part
V.B. would permit consolidation of most state/state and federal/state dueling
class actions. Although these proposals are controversial, they deserve serious
attention as they afford the opportunity to ameliorate the problems that plague
dueling class actions.
CONCLUSION

Whenever two or more class actions are filed on behalf of the same class,
seeking the same relief for the same wrong, numerous problems result: (1)
scarce resources are wasted, (2) counsel are subject to intense pressure to
settle, (3) class counsel, class members and the court all are compelled to make
important decisions without complete information, and (4) courts are required
to grapple with complex and difficult preclusion questions. These problems
seriously undermine the utility of the class action vehicle.
Numerous options exist to eliminate or greatly minimize these problems.
Legislation requiring maintenance of a class action registry and modification
of court rules to bar certification of marginally useful dueling class actions
would reduce the number of dueling class actions. Appointment of a class
advocate would provide the court with much better information regarding the
adequacy of any proposed settlement. Other modest proposals would assure
better information to class members and courts and minimize the likelihood or
negative effects of simultaneous class actions.
406 See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 264, § 5.01 cmt. a, at 222-24

("[T]he removal question must be decided by the Complex Litigation Panel .... ")
407 Cf id. § 5.01(a), at 221 (listing seven factors for the Panel to consider in making its
removal and consolidation decision).
408 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate ...

subclasses and each subclass treated as a class ....

).

a class may be divided into
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543

Consolidation of all dueling class actions is an alternative mechanism for
eliminating the problems posed by dueling class actions. Congress and the
state legislatures should enact the interjurisdictional transfer vehicles proposed
here to permit such consolidation and to revitalize the class action as an
effective tool in the administration of justice.
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